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WILL THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE VICTIMS? THE CASE
FOR PRE-TRIAL DISCLOSURE, AND THE UNCHARTED
FUTURE OF VICTIM IMPACT INFORMATION IN
CAPITAL JURY SENTENCING©
Jose Felipe Anderson*
-Men regard it as their right to return evil for evil-and, if they cannot, feel
they have lost their liberty.

Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics (4th C.B.C.)
- To return violence for violence does nothing but intensify the existence of
violence and evil in the universe. Someone must have sense enough to cut
off the chains of violence and hate.

Martin Luther King, Jr.
"Advice for Living" (1958)
I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court decision in Payne v. Tennessee, I
upholding the use of victim impact statements2 in capital jury sentencing

©

1997 by Jose Felipe Anderson.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A.,
University of Maryland Baltimore County 1981; J.D. University of Maryland School of Law
1984.
I would like to thank Paula. Johnson, Norman Amaker, Steven Grossman, Charles
Ogletree, George Lipman and George Burns for their comments and insights. If there is any
merit to this project, their efforts were responsible; if there are any short comings, they are
mine alone. My research assistants, DanieUe Fisher and Kimberley Wright-Jones, not only
provided superb information gathering and research but also pressed the victim's position in
earnest. Their efforts made this project more balanced than it would otherwise have been.
Barbara Jones is to be commended for her patience and her outstanding technical support. I
would also like to thank the University of Baltimore Educational Foundation for the research
grant that supported this effort. An earlier version of this paper was presented in February,
1995 at the Mideast People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference at Howard University
School of Law.
I. SOl U.S. 808 (1991).
367

368

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:367

proceedings, marked one of the most dramatic reversals of a precedent in the
history of United States constitutional jurisprudence. The decision in Payne
expressly overruled Booth v. Maryland 3 decided only four years earlier. The
Booth case rejected the use of victim impact statements in capital sentencing
cases that involved juries. In Payne, the Supreme Court made it clear that
victims were entitled to offer, and juries were permitted to consider, the
effect that a "death eligible" homicide had on surviving relatives, even if the
defendant was unaware of the impact he would cause at the time of the
crime.4
The understandable desire of surviving relatives to participate in the
criminal justice process, coupled with the perceived lack of balance which is
said to occur when the victim is not permitted to address the jury, while
members of the defendant's family are permitted to plead for the life of the
defendant, contributed to the Court's abrupt departure from its earlier
doctrine. In departing from Booth, however, the Supreme Court created a
potential for uncertainty and confusion in capital jury sentencing that is
likely to effect decisions by trial courts, prosecutors and defense attorneys
for years to come. This article is an attempt to examine what has occurred in
the Supreme Court regarding victim impact information.5 It will also explore
2. Although the Supreme Court and various statutory formulations refer to the victim
related material as "victim impact statements," see Payne, 501 U.S. at 821, at times during
this article I have characterized the subject matter as "victim impact information." In my
view, the term "victim impact statement" is underinclusive and misleading since it does not
convey the full range of the material that a capital sentencing jury may be permitted to
consider under the Payne decision.
3. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). Booth held by a 5-4 vote that victim impact statements were
unconstitutional in capital jury sentencing under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States' Constitution. Id. The Booth holding was also expressly reaffirmed in South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), in another 5-4 decision.
4. Payne, 501 U.S. at 80.
5. This article is primarily concerned with the problem victim impact information
poses in capital sentencing where juries are playing a role in either imposing or
recommending a sentence of death. Juries and jurors present special problems for the use of
such information that are not as prevalent when a trial judge is considering a capital sentence.
There is no constitutional requirement that a sentencing hearing in a capital case be
conducted before a jury. See Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995). In at least seven
states the judge alone makes the determination as to sentence in capital cases. Alabama, see
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (1994 & Supp. 1996), Arizona, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703
(Supp. 1996), Idaho, see IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Supp. 1996), Montana, see MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-301 (1995), Nebraska, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (R.S. Supp. 1995). In
contrast, Florida, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1996), and Indiana, see IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Bums Supp. 1996), provide for the jury to make a non-binding
recommendation to the judge. But "most states provide for a unitary capital trial in which the
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what the future holds for courts attempting to set boundaries on the
sentencing jury's consideration of such information. Finally, I will suggest
some procedural safeguards that federal and state courts or legislatures
concerned with capital cases should consider as they determine when it is
appropriate to make this type of information part of its capital sentencing
scheme.
The Supreme Court has expressed its concern that a capital sentencing
process should "facilitate the responsible and reliable exercise of sentencing
discretion."6 It has ruled that certain procedural safeguards must be put in
place to make the procedure constitutional. However, by removing the bright
line prohibition against victim impact information that the Supreme Court
previously announced in Booth, it has allowed a potentially volatile category
of evidence into capital cases without carefully explaining how it should be
considered by a sentencing jury. State and federal law remains unclear as to
jury adjudicate[s] guilt and punishment in a single proceeding." WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN EXAMINATION OF MODERN SYSTEMS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
73 (1991).
Although when Booth was first decided the Supreme Court did not expressly comment
on whether its holding applied to capital judge sentencing, most federal and state courts had
no trouble in distinguishing Booth and limiting its reach to capital jury cases. See, e.g., Evans
v. State, 563 N.E.2d 1251, 1263 (Ind. 1990); State v. McMillin, 783 S.w.2d 82,96 (Mo.
1990) (distinguishing between victim impact testimony in judge and jury sentencing);
Lightboume v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1987) (Booth exclusion not applicable to
death sentence based on jury's recommendation and not jury verdict); Tibbs v. State, 528
A.2d 510, 519 n.6 (Md. App. 1987) (holding that in a non-capital murder case, where victim's
father gave evidence of both the impact of the crime on the family and made a
recommendation of what he believed an appropriate sentence, neither circumstance
constituted error).
6. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,329 (1985). In Caldwell, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that "[a] capital sentencing jury is made up of individuals placed in a very
unfamiliar situation and called on to make a very difficult and uncomfortable choice ... they
are given only partial guidance as to how their judgment should be exercised, leaving them
with substantial discretion." [d. at 333.
The view that a jury should fix criminal punishment in many types of cases has existed
in this country since the early 20th century. STAT. OF ARK. (Crawford & Moses 1921), ch. 44,
§ 3203; 3 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. (Callaghan 1924); CODE OF VA. § 4784 (1919), VA. CODE §
4784 (Michie 1936) ("The punishment in all criminal cases tried by a jury shall be ascertained
by the jury trying the same within the limits prescribed by law.") (cited in Note, Should the
Jury Fix the Punishment for Crimes?, 24 VA. L. REV. 462, 463-64 (1937». Such statutes were
criticized at the time they were in effect, see Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, A
Rationale of the Law of Homicide II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1261, 1306-07 (1937); Charles Kerr,
A Needed Reform in Criminal Procedure, 6 Ky. LJ. 107,108 (1918), primarily because juries
lack experience in determining what degree of punishment is appropriate.
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how vIctlm impact evidence is relevant to establish statutorily relevant
aggravating circumstances or how it should be considered as a sentencing
factor.
Not only do uncertainties exist that concern the relevance of such
information, but consideration of the confrontation7 problems presented by
victim impact evidence have been largely unaddressed by the courts.
Furthermore, legitimate questions arise regarding whether a defendant is
entitled to any pre-trial disclosure of who the victims are, what they intend to
present and how they intend to present their stories. This article advances the
proposition that disclosure of victim impact information should be available
at least in time for a capital defendant to consider his election of either a
judge or a jury sentencing, where an election of the sentencer is available.
I will ftrst examine the short but turbulent reign of Booth's per se ban of
victim impact information and Payne's dramatic and controversial' reversal
of Booth. Secondly, I will examine the history of victim participation in
sentencing and the rise and influence of the modem "victims rights"
movement on sentencing in general and capital sentencing in particular.
Thirdly, I will examine the major criticisms of the use of victim impact
information in capital sentencing, focusing particularly on the racial disparity
that is likely to occur when the emphasis on capital sentencing is focused on
the victim. Finally, I will offer some suggestions to improve the fairness in
the use of victim impact information in capital cases for both defendants and
victims. Hopefully, I will demonstrate why disclosure of victim impact
evidence early in the capital case should be adopted as a threshold procedural
safeguard if capital sentencing is to retain any integrity at all.
The seriousness of capital jury sentencing, and the recognition that
victim impact information is going to be a part of such sentencing in the
foreseeable future, requires that serious attention be given to those matters
left unaddressed by the Supreme Court. Lower courts will be required to
resolve such concerns generated by the Supreme Court's recent
pronouncement on victim impact information in Payne and the uncharted
course set by that precedent. It is certain that any court involved in the
process of administering the death penalty must confront the difftcult and
recurring issues which are generated when a capital sentencing jury is asked
to consider "victim impact" in the calculus of its "life or death decision."

7. In neither Booth nor Payne was the Sixth Amendment confrontation provision
discussed in any detail, but the elusive character of victim impact information raises serious
questions about how, if at all, it can be rebutted.
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II. THE RISE AND RUIN OF BOOTH v. MARYlAND: "RETHINKING THE
EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY"
On June 15, 1987 , Justice Lewis F. Powell, writing for a slim five justice
majority, announced the first "bright line" exclusion of a category of
evidence used by the prosecution in capital sentencing. Booth v. Maryianci8
held that the introduction of a victim impact statement "at the sentencing
phase of a capital murder trial violates the Eighth Amendment . . . ."9 The
Booth case involved the killing of an elderly West Baltimore couple, 78year-old Irvin and 75-year-old Rose Bronstein. 1O John Booth, a neighbor of
the Bronsteins, along with an accomplice, Willie Reid, entered the victim's
home, apparently for the purpose of stealing money to buy drugs. I I After
being bound and gagged, the victims were killed by repeated stab wounds in
the chest with a kitchen knife. The Bronsteins were not discovered until two
days later by their son. 12 The jury found Booth guilty of two counts of first
degree murder, two counts of robbery and two counts of conspiracy to
commit robbery.13 The prosecution sought the death penalty and Booth
elected to have his sentence determined by a jury instead of a judge. 14
8. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). Prior to the Booth case, several state courts had addressed the
question of the admissibility of victim impact testimony and concluded that it should not be
admitted. See, e.g., Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (testimony of
victim's father regarding victim's character not proper rebuttal); Patterson v. State, 5 I3 So. 2d
1263 (Fla. 1987) (victim impact and views of survivors not proper aggravation); Jones v.
State, 738 P.2d 525 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (photos of victims inadmissible); Parker v. State,
731 S.W.2d 756 (Ark. 1987) (victim's photos inadmissible); State v. Hope, 508 N.E.2d 202
(III. 1986) (evidence and argument regarding victim's life required reversal); People v. Levitt,
156 Cal. App. 3d 500 (1984) (bereavement of victim's family not proper factor for noncapital sentencing).
9. Booth, 482 U.S. at 509. Although the Supreme Court had never rendered an opinion
excluding the admission of evidence under the Eighth Amendment prior to Booth, it had
ruled, on a number of occasions that certain evidence could not be excluded if offered on
behalf of a capital defendant. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), the Supreme Court
invalidated an Ohio statute which precluded a capital defendant from introducing evidence
intended to relate to his character and background. The case was followed by Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) and Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986). In
Eddings, the court required that testimony of child neglect and abuse by the defendant's father
be introduced. Skipper permitted a capital defendant to admit evidence of his "well behaved
and peaceful adjustment to prison life."
10. Booth, 482 U.S. at 497.
II. [d. at 497-498.
12. /d. at 498.
13. /d.
14. [d. (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(b) (1982». Pursuant to Maryland law the
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At the sentencing phase, the state offered into evidence a pre-sentence
investigation report which included evidence of the effect of the crime on
members of the Bronstein family.15 In Maryland, at the time Booth was
tried, state law required that a victim impact statement be supplied as part of
the pre-sentence investigation. 16 The relevant Maryland law specifically
listed the information required to be collected and presented to the
sentencing jury .17
capital defendant is to be sentenced following the gUilty verdict "as soon as practicable." In
most cases this means the sentencing would occur immediately following the trial, often the
very next day. Under the statute the defendant would be permitted to waive the right to a jury
and be sentenced by the judge. States vary as to what sentencing options it offers the capital
defendant. See supra note 5. Nevertheless, the overwhelming preference for the option of a
jury sentencing supports the notion that a jury decision as to the appropriate sentence in a
capital case reflects the sentiment that the decision will represent the collective conscience of
the community. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). Thus,
the defendant, in most jurisdictions, is at least offered the choice between the judge, a
decision-making professional, or the members of the public. "Two thirds of the states with
capital statutes and the federal government accord the jury final sentencing power." Katheryn
K. Russell, The Constitutionality of Jury Override in Alabama Death Penalty Cases, 46 ALA.
L. REV. 5, 9 (1994). The popularity of jury trial provision in capital cases reflects "a
reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a
group of judges." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
15. Booth, 482 U.S. at 500. Victim impact statements are often part of a pre-sentence
investigation report or contain some information that would ordinarily be contained in such
reports. It has been suggested that such reports are "the single most important document at
both the sentencing and correctional levels of the criminal process." Stephen A. Fennell &
William N. Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and Legal Analysis of the
Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1615, 1623 (1980).
16. [d. at 492 (citing MD. CODE ANN. art. 41, § 4-609(d) (1986)). In 1983, the Maryland
General Assembly amended the VIS provision to provide that:
In any case in which the death penalty . . . is requested ... a presentence
investigation, including a victim impact statement ... shall be completed by the
Division of Parole and Probation, and shall be considered by the court or jury before
whom the separate sentencing proceeding is conducted ....
§ 4-609(d) (1992).
17. Booth, 482 U.S. at 498 (citing MD. CODE ANN. art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1986)).
Specifically, the report shall:
(i) Identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense;
(iii)Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the offense along
with its seriousness and permanence;
(iv)Describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as
a result of the offense;
(v) Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim or the
victim's family as a result of the offense; and
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Interviews with the family by probation officials were the primary source
of materials supplied in the report.l 8 The material collected from the family
included interviews with the victims' son, daughter, son-in-law, and
granddaughter. 19 After some discussion between court and counsel, it was
decided that the prosecutor would read the statement to the jury, rather than
have family members testify before the jury .20 Defense counsel objected to
the admission of the statement as both "irrelevant and unduly inflammatory,
and that therefore its use . . . violated the Eighth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution ."21
The information read to the sentencing jury included a list of the victims'
surviving family members, including grandchildren, and reports of how
family members felt when they first heard about the tragedy. The statement
permitted the family to relate their religious tradition, to recall past family
events with their slain relatives, and to tell the jury about the many people
who attended the funera1. 22
In striking down the admission of the statement, the majority of the
Supreme Court relied on the joint opinion in Gregg v. Georgia 23 authored by
Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens. That opinion cautioned that a
sentencing jury's discretion to impose a death sentence must be "suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action."24 After noting that the victim impact evidence admitted
in the Booth case was of two varieties: first, information involving personal
characteristics of the victim and emotional impact of the crime, and second,
(vi)Contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the
victim or the victim's family that the trial court requires.
§ 4-609(c)(3).
18. Booth, 482 U.S. at 499.
19. [d.
20. /d. at SOl. It has been suggested that the written victim impact statement read to the

jury is not as troublesome for a defendant as the victim's oral testimony. See also infra note
200.
21. [d. at 500-501.
22. [d. at 509-515. The appendix to the opinion of the court contains the entire victim
impact statement read to Booth's sentencing jury. It presents a clear picture of the almost
limitless range of information that the trial judge considered from family members.
At oral argument before the Supreme Court, George E. Bums, Jr., counsel for Booth,
suggested that victim impact testimony in a capital case would be similar to executing a
defendant based on the results of a public opinion poll. "An '800 number' linked to the
courtroom would achieve the same purpose as a victim impact statement." 4 CRIM. L. RPT.
4013 (BNA 1987) (reprinting argument of Booth v. Maryland on April 15, 1987).
23. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
24. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189).
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relating to the family members' opinions about the appropriate sentence, the
court concluded that neither category of information was relevant to the
capital sentencing decision. 25
The Court held that the admission of the evidence created for Booth "a
constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death penalty
in an arbitrary and capricious manner."26 In excluding the evidence, the
Court rejected the argument that the personal loss of the family members
should be considered a "circumstance" of the crime.27 The Court expressed
concern that the defendant might be punished as a result of consequences he
could not have been aware of at the time he selected his victim. 28 The Court
25. [d. at 502.
26. [d. at 503. The Court's focus on avoiding arbitrary and capricious capital sentences

was not surprising. In the absence of precedent excluding a category of information from the
traditionally broad discretion afforded judges in sentencing, see Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 244-45 (1949) (recognizing that sentencing judges have wide discretion as to the
sources and types of information to consider at sentencing), the Court needed a basis for
limiting what jurors could take into account. The Court had little choice other than to rely on
the broad "arbitrary and capricious" doctrine it had developed in its post-1972 jurisprudence.
See e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). The
Supreme Court's decision in Furman, which produced multiple sets of concurring opinions
critical of the manner in which the death penalty was being administered at that time,
provided the basis for relief when the Court believed state punishment schemes were unfairly
administered. /d.
The principal theme on which consensus could be reached in Furman was that even if
the punishment could, in theory, be constitutionally applied, the unguided, standardless,
discretion resulted in unfair and inconsistent results. Citing the Eighth Amendment's cruel
and unusual punishment proscriptions, one justice described the process in place across the
country at the time as arbitrary as being "struck by lightening." [d. at 309 (Stewart, J.
concurring). Capital punishment statutes were thereafter required to provide guidance for the
jury with adequate procedural safeguards. The Court spelled out some of those safeguards in a
set of opinions issued on the same day in 1976 which authorized statutes that included (1) a
two-part trial where the gUilt/innocence determination is separated from the sentencing
determination (bifurcation); (2) a specific list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to
limit the jury's discretion; and (3) automatic appellate review. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
27. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502-03.
28. [d. at 504. A fundamental debate which undergirds the question of what sentencing
criteria are appropriate to consider involves the determination of what circumstances society
intends to punish. Simply stated, is a person punished for his or her actions and intentions or
should the punishment also reflect the full scope of the harm caused by the offender? This
question is not unique to capital punishment or criminal law. The classic debate over the
appropriate scope of punishment for offenders involved in homicide prosecutions under both
the common law and statutory felony murder doctrine provides rich examples of the
problematic policy concerns encountered when courts attempt to draw the line. See generally
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was also particularly "troubled by the implication that defendants whose
victims were assets to their community are more deserving of punishment
than those whose victims are perceived to be less worthy."29
The Court also pointed out several potential problems encountered by
the defendant attempting to rebut such evidence, noting, among other things,
the "strategic risks of attacking the victim's character before the jury."30 In
two separate opinions, Justice White and Justice Scalia dissented, each of
those opinions was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor.
Justice White's opinion concluded that since the Maryland legislature
had decided that the sentencing jury should hear the degree of harm that the
defendant had caused, its judgment was "entitled to particular deference"
since sentencing considerations are "peculiarly' questions of legislative
policy."31 Noting that victim impact information is regularly used in non-

People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1980) (explaining the historical development of the
felony murder rule and limiting its application); David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In
Defense of The Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J. L. & PuB. POL'y 359 (1985) (arguing in
favor of the felony murder rule).
Tort doctrine regarding the foreseeability of the harm as the test for the limits of civil
liability have also been plagued with controversy. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (5th ed. 1984).
29. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506 n.8. The problem of whether the criminal justice system
should recognize that the taking of some lives should require a greater punishment than others
is a difficult one to avoid. In the celebrated Charles Lindberg baby kidnapping case, see State
v. Hauptmann, 115 NJ.L. 412, 180 A. 809 (1935), public hysteria over the crime and the
enormous popUlarity of the family of the victim not only influenced the death sentence in that
case but also changed the national law on felony murder, burglary and kidnapping following
the case. See AMORE A. MOENSSENS, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL LAW 501-02 (5th
ed. 1992) (1973). A jury sharing a general view of a victim's importance to society will likely
bring that view into the jury room when it makes its decision in a capital case. One common
example of victim preference is that many capital punishment statutes include, as an
aggravating circumstance, the killing of a police officer in the line of duty. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(8) (Harrison 1994). Such statutes reflect a public legislative
determination that the killing of a police officer is more deserving of severe punishment than
the killing of an ordinary citizen.
30. Booth, 482 U.S. at 507.
31. Id. at 515 (White, J. dissenting) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184 (quoting Gore v.
United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958»). Justice White's assessment of the legislature's
traditionally broad role in sentencing is well founded. As one commentator cogently
explained:
[t]he legislature determines the kind and potential degree of punishment involved for
each offense and the identity of the sentencing authority. The legislature's sentencing
system should reflect its underlying view of the purposes served by the criminal
sanction-retribution, specific and general deterrence, incapacitation, or
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capital contexts, he suggested it was particularly appropriate to consider in a
capital case.32 Justice White characterized the concerns over the differing
ability of family members to articulate the extent of their loss as "a make
weight consideration."33 Justice White dismissed the majority's concern over
problems of rebutting victim impact evidence by pointing out that in the
instant case such concerns were purely hypothetica1. 34 Justice White also felt
compelled to comment that if there were some disadvantage to the defendant,
who in pressing hard to rebut a victim impact statement offended the jury, he
should not "be heard to complain of the consequences of his tactical
decisions."35
In a separate dissent, Justice Scalia emphasized his view that "the
amount of harm one causes does bear upon the extent of his 'personal
responsibility.' "36 Questioning whether there was constitutional or historical
support for such a limitation on the imposition of capital punishment, Justice
Scalia noted the perception of unfairness generated by the absence of
victim's input into the capital sentencing process.37
Although the Court was closely divided, the majority opinion left little
flexibility to permit direct victim participation in capital cases. It appeared
that at least for the foreseeable future, the use of victim impact evidence of
rehabilitation . . . . The criminal process should be structured to promote the
legislature's sentencing system and goals.
Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger
Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. LJ. 185,198-99 (1983).
32. Booth, 482 U.S. at 515-16.
33. Id.at518.
34. Id. at 518, n.3.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 520. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's views were embraced by several
commentators after the Booth decision. See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, Booth v. Maryland and the
Individual Vengeance Rationale for Criminal Punishment, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
177 (1989) (it may be proper to permit family anguish to be considered in order to satisfy a
sense of justice); Lester K. Syren, Booth v. Maryland: Whether Victim Impact Statements are
Unconstitutional in Death Penalty Cases, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'y. 171
(1989) (without victim impact evidence, capital juries are sentencing with "impaired vision");
Jackson R. Sharman, III, Comment, Victim Impact Statements and the Eighth AmendmentBooth v. Maryland 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987), II HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'y. 583 (1988)
(considered the decision in Booth a "willful disregard for a democratic choice," since the
citizens of Maryland had passed the victim impact evidence statute); Regina A. Jones,
Comment, Eighth Amendment Prohibits Introduction of Victim Impact Evidence of Sentencing
Phase of Capital Murder Trial, 19 RUTGERS LJ. 1159 (1988) (accusing Supreme Court of
overstepping the bounds of proper judicial review in Booth by issuing a per se blanket
exclusion of victim impact information).
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the type presented in Booth, designed to influence the imposition of the death
sentence, was a closed question-despite the "victim based" concerns of the
Booth dissenters. However, South Carolina prosecutors, who were reluctant
to give up a powerful tool in their capital sentencing arsenal, brought another
victim impact case to the Supreme Court less than two years after the Booth
decision. In South Carolina v. Gathers,38 the death sentence of Demetrius
Gathers had been overturned by the South Carolina Supreme Court. 39
The case involved the killing of Richard Haynes who Gathers
encountered in a park. Along with some companions, Gathers beat and
kicked Haynes severely, smashed a bottle and umbrella over his head and
ultimately inserted the umbrella into his anus. 4O According to the evidence,
the beating resulted when Gathers attempted to initiate a conversation with
Haynes.41 Haynes was a 31-year-old unemployed man who had spent some
time in mental hospitals. He considered himself a minister, although he had
no formal religious training and carried with him two bibles and other
religious articles including religious tracts, one of which was entitled "The
Game Guy's Prayer."42 After the altercation, Gathers and the others
rummaged through Haynes' pockets and scattered his personal belongings
and the religious tracts.43
The articles found at the scene were admitted into evidence without
objection. At the sentencing phase, the prosecutor made "extensive
comments" to the jury about the victim's religious nature.44
38. 490 U.s. 805 (1989).
39. Jd. at 810.
40. [d. at 806-07.
41. [d. at 807.
42. [d.
43. [d.
44. [d. at

808- 10. Although offering no direct victim impact testimony, the South
Carolina prosecutor offered the following arguments to the sentencing jury:
We know from the proof that Reverend Minister Haynes was a religious person. He
had his religious items out there. This defendant strewn [sic] them across the bike
path, thinking nothing of that.
Among the many cards that Reverend Haynes had among his belongings was this
card .... He had this [sic] religious items, his beads. He had a plastic angel. Of
course, he is now with the angels now, but this defendant Demetrius Gathers could
care little about the fact that he is a religious person. Cared little of the pain and
agony he inflicted upon a person who is trying to enjoy one of our public parks.
But look at Reverend Minister Haynes' prayer. It's called the Game Guy's Prayer.
"Dear God, help me to be a sport in this little game of life. I don't ask for any easy
place in this lineup. Play me anywhere you need me. I only ask you for the stuff to
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Relying on Booth v. Maryland, the South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed the death sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing.
South Carolina appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens,
affirmed the South Carolina court and extended the victim impact
information prohibition to the prosecutor's closing arguments. Rejecting
South Carolina's argument that the prosecutor's comments were only
arguments relating to the circumstances of the crime, Justice Brennan
reasoned:
The fact that Gathers scattered Haynes' personal papers around his body
while going through them looking for something to steal was certainly a
relevant circumstance of the crime, and thus a proper subject for comment.
But the prosecutor's argument in this case went well beyond that fact: he
read to the jury at length from the religious tract the victim was carrying and
commented on the personal qualities he inferred from Haynes' possession of
the "Game Guy's Prayer" and the voter registration card. The content of
these cards, however, cannot possibly have been relevant to the
"circumstances of the crime." There is no evidence whatever that the
defendant read anything that was printed on either the tract or the voter card.
Indeed, it is extremely unlikely that he did so.45

Justice White, reluctantly joined the majority, concluding that he must
join Brennan's opinion unless Booth was to be overruled.46
Justice O'Connor authored a dissenting opinion, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice Kennedy, in which she advanced the view that Booth was
wrongly decided, and stated that she stood "ready to overrule it if the court
would do so ...."47 Justice O'Connor, however, suggested an alternative to
requiring that Booth be overruled in order to reinstate Gathers' death
sentence. She reasoned that the statements made by the prosecution in
Gathers' could be distinguished from those in Booth since that case involved
statements of harm to the victim's family and the statements at issue in

give you one hundred percent of what I have got. If all the hard drives seem to come
my way, I thank you for the compliment. Help me to remember that you won't ever
let anything come my way that you and I together can't handle. And help me to take
the bad break as part of the game ...."
45. Id.at811.
46. Id. at 812. (White, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 813-14. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Gathers were "solely prosecutorial comments about the victim himself."48
She urged the majority to recognize "[t]he fact that there is a victim, and
facts about the victim properly developed during the course of the trial, are
not so far outside the realm of circumstances of the crime ...."49
In a separate dissent, Justice Scalia endorsed the immediate overruling of
Booth. He believed that the state should decide whether it wished to consider
victim impact evidence at capital sentencing proceedings. He wrote that it
would be "a violation of my oath to adhere to what I consider a plainly
unjustified intrusion upon the democratic process in order that the Court
might save face."50 In reviewing his earlier attack on the validity of the
Booth decision, Justice Scalia wrote that "Booth has not even an arguable
basis in the common law background that led up to the Eighth Amendment
"51
48. Jd. at 814. Interestingly, in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397-98 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (1988), decided in the term after Booth, three justices joined the dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist which suggested that Booth's application should not
extend to comments about the victim himself. Justice Kennedy had recently joined the Court.
It would have appeared that there were at least five justices who by that time, had expressed a
less restrictive view of Booth: the Chief Justice, Justice White, Justice O'Connor and now
Justice Kennedy. Justice White, the other original dissenter in Booth, however, was in the
majority in Mills, which reversed the conviction of the capital defendant on a jury instruction
issue unrelated to victim impact evidence. In fact, he authored the opinion of the Court.
Perhaps the replacement of Justice Powell, the author of Booth, with Justice Kennedy, who in
his first term seemed willing to disagree with the sweeping conclusions about the
admissibility of victim impact announced in Booth, would have logically resulted in the
conclusion that Booth was ripe to be overruled in Gathers. Justice White's reluctance to
abandon precedent so readily, see supra note 46, ironically resulted in an expansion of Booth
in Gathers, despite a majority of justices that had already announced their disagreement with
the general rule established just one year earlier.
49. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 816 (citation omitted). Statements about the victim of the
killing can be more easily justified as "circumstances of the crime" than comments by
surviving victims about their grief. The facts clearly indicate that Gathers knew what his
victim was doing at the time he killed him. Jd. at 815 (O'Connor, 1., dissenting). In this
regard, the South Carolina prosecutors and Justice O'Connor may well have been correct.
Indeed, the state of South Carolina devoted all but a page and a half of its petition for
certiorari's "reason for granting the writ" to making the point that O'Connor stressed in her
dissent. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, petition for cert. filed (Aug. 5, 1988)
(No.

18-30).
50. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 825. (Scalia, J., dissenting).

'51. Jd. Justice Scalia commented that he doubted "overruling Booth will so shake the
citizenry's faith in the Court." Jd. at 824. He further urged that if Booth was going to be
overruled it should occur as soon as possible. Justice Scalia reasoned that:
[tJhe respect accorded prior decisions increases, rather than decreases, with their
antiquity, as the society adjusts itself to their existence, and the surrounding law
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It certainly appeared that even though Booth and Gathers were narrow 54 decisions, that the doctrine excluding victim impact was expanding and
state courts were treating the Booth/Gathers duo as mandating limits on all
forms of victim impact evidence.52 Furthermore, considerable scholarly
commentary endorsed the legitimacy of the Booth/Gathers victim impact
prohibitions.53
Those who were disappointed that victims would have no voice in
capital jury sentencing would not have long to wait for the court to examine
its position on victim impact testimony. On the very last day of the 19901991 Term, the Supreme Court overturned the Booth/Gathers per se bar
excluding victim's impact evidence in capital jury sentencing in its
controversial 6-3 decision in Payne. 54 Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the
Court's opinion that ended the brief reign of Booth as a formidable obstacle

becomes premised upon their validity. The freshness of error not only deprives it of
the respect to which long-established practice is entitled, but also counsels that the
opportunity of correction be seized at once, before state and federal laws and
practices have been adjusted to embody it. That is particularly true with respect to a
decision such as Booth, which is in that line of cases purporting to reflect "evolving
standards of decency" applicable to capital punishment.
Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,101 (1958».
52. See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 576 So. 2d 236, 254 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (daughter's
statement about the magnitude of her loss when defendant murdered her mother and her
recommendation of the appropriate sentence mandated reversal in light of Booth); State v.
Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 575 A.2d 816 (1990) (prosecution argument that the jury should
render a death sentence "even if it is just for the victim," was reversible error); State v.
Clausell, 121 N J. 298, 580 A.2d 221 (1990) (prosecutor may not divert the jury from material
facts by undue emphasis on the "worthiness" of victim designed to excite the jury); Jackson v.
Dugger, 547 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1989) (officer.'s testimony detailing the impact of the victim
officer's death on fellow police officers was improper).
53. For examples of commentary endorsing the Booth decision, see Susan J. Jump,
Comment, Booth v. Maryland: Admissibility of Victim Impact Statements During Sentencing
Phase of Capital Murder Trials, 21 GA. L. REV. 1191, 1213 (1987) ("the rights of defendants
convicted of capital crimes cannot be sacrificed or infringed upon due to concerns for the
victims"); Kevin J. McCoy, Note, Preserving Integrity in Capital Sentencing: Booth v.
Maryland, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 333,350 (1988) ("Booth stands as a sound decision which
should help further understanding of the Court's consistent admonitions against arbitrariness
in sentencing ...."); Charlton T. Howard, ill, Note, Booth v. Maryland: Death Knell for the
Victim Impact Statement?, 47 MD. L. REV. 701, 731 (1988) ("formalized role for the victim at
sentencing, no matter what its specific form, detracts from the sentencing authority's focus on
the defendant and imperils the very concept of individualized sentencing").
54. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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to death penalty prosecution and which had been an aggravation to victim's
rights advocates. 55
In that Tennessee murder case the prosecution established that Payne's
victims were 28-year-old Charisse Christopher, her two-year-old daughter,
Lacie, and her three-year-old son, Nicholas. The three lived together in an
apartment across the hall from Payne's girlfriend. 56 According to the State's
evidence, on Saturday , June 27, 1987, Payne visited his girlfriend's
apartment expecting her to return from out of town. While he waited, he
passed the time injecting cocaine and drinking beer.57 After leaving the
apartment for a time, Payne returned, but rather than returning to his
girlfriend's apartment, he entered the Christopher's apartment and began
making sexual advances towards Charisse.58
When she resisted his advances, Payne became violent and a downstairs
neighbor reported hearing a "blood curdling scream" from the Christopher
residence.59 Police responded to the scene and observed Payne covered with
blood.60 Payne struck the officer and fled. 61 Further investigation revealed
that Charisse Christopher and her children were lying on the kitchen floor,
suffering from multiple stab wounds. Charisse and Lacie were dead;
Nicholas, however, survived his serious injuries.62
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See sources cited above in note 37.
Payne, 501 U.S. at 811.
[d.at812.
/d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 812 (citing State v. Payne, 791 S.w.2d 10, 12 (Tenn. 1990».
/d. The Court in its opinion drew from the lower court painful details of the murder

scene as discovered by the authorities:
Inside the apartment, the police encountered a horrifying scene. Blood covered the
walls and floor throughout the unit. Chari sse and her children were lying on the floor
in the kitchen. Nicholas, despite several wounds inflicted by a butcher knife that
completely penetrated through his body from front to back, was still breathing.
Miraculously, he survived, but not until after undergoing seven hours of surgery and
a transfusion of 1700 cc's of blood-400 to 500 cc's more than his estimated normal
blood volume. Charisse and Lacie were dead.
Charisse's body was found on the kitchen floor on her back, her legs fully extended.
She had sustained 42 direct knife wounds and 42 defensive wounds on her arms and
hands. The wounds were caused by 41 separate thrusts of a butcher knife. None of
the 84 wounds inflicted by Payne were individually fatal; rather, the cause of death
was most likely bleeding from all of the wounds.
Lacie's body was on the kitchen floor near her mother. She had suffered stab wounds
to the chest, abdomen, back, and head. The murder weapon, a butcher knife, was
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Payne was later apprehended. In its opinion, the Supreme Court
characterized the evidence against Payne as "overwhelming" and
"uncontroverted ."63
The jury, obviously persuaded that the evidence was at least adequate,
returned guilty verdicts against Payne on all counts.64
At the sentencing phase of the trial, the defense presented evidence of
four witnesses: a clinical psychologist, Payne's mother, father, girlfriend, and
Bobbie Thomas. 65 Dr. John T. Huston testified that Payne's low IQ score
qualified him as mentally handicapped and found him to be "the most polite
prisoner he had ever met."66 The doctor, however, found no evidence to
support that Payne was either "psychotic" or "schizophrenic."67
Payne's parents testified their son had no prior criminal record and no
history of drug or alcohol abuse. 68 Bobbie Thomas, Payne's girlfriend at the
time of the incident, corroborated the testimony of Payne's parents.69 She
stated that she met Payne in church and that he was a caring person who
"behaved just like a father" to her three children.70
The state countered with the victim impact testimony of Charisse
Christopher's mother, Mary Zvolanek, who described how the murder of
Charisse and Lacie had affected Nicholas.7 1 The prosecutor referred to the

found at her feet. Payne's baseball cap was snapped on her arm near her elbow. Three
cans of malt liquor bearing Payne's fingerprints were found on a table near her body,
and a fourth empty one was on the landing outside the apartment door.
Payne was apprehended later that day hiding in the attic of the home of a former
girlfriend. As he descended the stairs of the attic, he stated to the arresting officers,
"Man, I ain't killed no woman ...." According to one of the officers, Payne had "a
wild look about him. His pupils were contracted. He was foaming at the mouth,
saliva. He appeared to be very nervous. He was breathing real rapid ...." He had
blood on his body and clothes and several scratches across his chest. It was later
determined that the blood stains matched.
/d. at 812-13 (citing State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Tenn. 1990» (citation omitted).
63. [d. at 812-13.
64. [d. at 813.
65. [d. at 814.
66. [d.
67. /d.
68. [d.
69. [d.
70. [d.
71. [d. Zvolanek's testimony about Nicholas was cited by the court as follows:

He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she doesn't come home.
And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me many times during the week and
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emotional testimony of Zvolanek and discussed the long-tenn victim impact
extensively in his closing argument,72 urging that the jury return with the
death penalty. The jury imposed death on each of the two murder counts.73
Seizing the opportunity to strike down the Booth/Gathers victim impact
exclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed the general principles to be
applied when the Supreme Court considers overruling one of its prior
precedents.74 The Chief Justice noted that "when governing decisions are
asks me, Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I'm
worried about my Lacie.
[d. at 814-15.
72. [d. at 815. The prosecutor's argument referring to the impact of the crime on
Nicholas was as follows:
There is nothing you can do to ease the pain of any of the families involved in
this case. There is nothing you can do to ease the pain of Bernice or Carl Payne, and
that's a tragedy. There is nothing you can do basically to ease the pain of Mr. and
Mrs. Zvolanek, and that's a tragedy. They will have to live with it the rest of their
lives. There is obviously nothing you can do for Charisse and Lacie Jo. But there is
something that you can do for Nicholas.
Somewhere down the road Nicholas is going to grow up, hopefully. He's going to
want to know what happened. And he is going to know what happened to his baby
sister and his mother. He is going to want to know what type of justice was done. He
is going to want to know what happened. With your verdict, you will provide the
answer.
[d.

During his comments on rebuttal, the prosecutor made additional references to the
impact of the crime on Nicholas:
No one will ever know about Lacie Jo because she never had the chance to grow
up. Her life was taken from her at the age of two years old. So, no there won't be a
high school principal to talk about Lacie Jo Christopher, and there won't be anybody
to take her to her high school prom. And there won't be anybody there-there won't
be her mother there or Nicholas' mother there to kiss him at night. His mother will
never kiss him good night or pat him as he goes off to bed, or hold him and sing him
a lullaby.
[Petitioner's attorney] wants you to think about a good reputation, people who
love the defendant and things about him. He doesn't want you to think about the
people who love Chari sse Christopher, her mother and daddy who loved her. The
people who loved little Lacie Jo, the grandparents who are still here. The brother who
mourns for her every single day and wants to know where his best little playmate is.
He doesn't have anybody to watch cartoons with him, a little one. These are the
things that go into why it is especially cruel, heinous, and atrocious, the burden that
child will carry forever.
[d. at 816.
73. [d.
74. /d. at 828.
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unworkable or badly reasoned, the Court has never felt constrained to follow
precedent."75 In reasoning that the Booth/Gathers doctrine was unworkable,
the Chief Justice examined the philosophy and history of sentencing.7 6
Citing the 18th century Italian criminologist Cesare Beccana, Chief Justice
Rehnquist said that the notion "the punishment should fit the crime" has long
been a guiding principle of sentencing.77
He vigorously complained that the Booth/Gathers principle was unfair to
the state since "the State is barred from either offering 'a quick glimpse of
the life' which a defendant 'chose to extinguish' or demonstrating the loss to
the victim's family and to society."78
Seizing upon Justice O'Connor's earlier dissent in Gathers, Rehnquist
wrote that "Booth deprives the State of the full moral force of its evidence
...."79 Chief Justice Rehnquist seemed particularly annoyed by the fact that
in Payne the defendant was able to place evidence of his good character
before the jury but the State was not able to do the same regarding the
victims. 80
75. Id. at 827.
76. Id. at 819-20.
77. Id.at819.
78~ Id. at 822 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting». Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Exodus 21:22-23; JAMES A. FARRER, CRIMES AND
PuNISHMENTS 199 (London 1880); and S. ANTON WHEELER ET. AL., SIlTING IN JUDGMENT:
THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 56 (1988), in support of the proposition that
the punishment should fit the crime. /d. at 819-20. Implicit in Rehnquist's assertions is the
principle of retribution. The Supreme Court has often addressed such a punishment objective.
For example, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Supreme Court, quoting Justice
Potter Stewart, commented on the value of retribution:
[t]he instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct
in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the
stability of society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized
society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they
"deserve," then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice,
and lynch law.
Id. at 183 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.s. 238, 308 (1972».
79. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
80. Id. at 826. Justice Rehnquist quoted the Supreme Court of Tennessee in making his
point:
The Supreme Court of Tennessee in this case obviously felt the unfairness of the rule
pronounced by Booth when it said: "It is an affront to the civilized members of the
human race to say that at sentencing in a capital case, a parade of witnesses may
praise the background, character and good deeds of Defendant (as was done in this.
case), without limitation as to relevancy, but nothing may be said that bears upon the
character of, or the harm imposed, upon the victims."
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The Court reasoned that such testimony was relevant and perfectly
consistent with the traditional latitude of the states to devise procedures for
the use of victim impact information. 81 First, it said that if evidence was "so
unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for
relief."82 The Court further noted that it was only addressing the
admissibility of evidence and argument relating to the impact of the victim's
death on the family and not characterizations and opinions about the crime
and the appropriateness of a death sentence that was part of the evidence at
issue in Booth. 83 No evidence of such opinions or characterizations were at
issue in Payne.
Payne also produced three concurring opinions which appeared to be an
attempt to explain or justify Rehnquist's abrupt departure from precedent.
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that a State may determine that
victim-impact testimony is relevant to a capital sentencing decision, relying
primarily on a societal consensus in support of allowing the evidence. 84
Justice O'Connor relied heavily on a due process analysis to conclude that
the result in Payne was appropriate.85
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, vigorously attacked the dissent
of Justice Thurgood Marshall.86 In his substantive discussion of victim
impact evidence, he not only relied on societal acceptance of victim impact
information but harshly criticized the line of cases beginning with Locketr87
which entitled the defendant to have broad latitude in presenting mitigating
evidence to the sentencing jury.88
A separate concurrence by Justice Souter and joined by Justice Kennedy
focused on the fact that impact on the victim's survivors is a foreseeable
consequence of murder and that it was not unreasonable to conclude that the
defendant should be assessed for the consequences of the risk he assumed. 89
(quoting State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990».
81. Jd. at 824-25.
82. /d. at 825.
83. /d. at 830 n.2.
84. Jd. at 830-31. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
85. Jd. at 831-32 (O'Connor, 1., concurring).
86. Jd. at 833-34 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Marshall's dissent is discussed in detail
infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
87. Jd. at 833. See supra note 9.
88. Jd. at 833-34.
89. Jd. at 838-39. According to Justice Souter:
Le]very defendant knows, if endowed with the mental competence for criminal
responsibility, that the life he will take by his homicidal behavior is that of a unique
/d.
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Using an elaborate hypothetical, he reasoned that Booth should be overruled
because it embraced a standard that was unworkable and could lead to
potentially arbitrary results. 90 .
In a blistering dissent, Justice Marshall criticized the court for its casual
departure from precedent. He noted that the majority made no "extraordinary
showing"91 before overruling its recent decisions in Booth and Gathers and
expressed disbelief in the majority's "radical assertion that it need not even
try ."92 Warning that the Court's action in Payne paid little respect to
precedent, he identified several potential cases that might be ripe for
reexamination and revision under the court's analysis in Payne. 93 He
person, like himself, and that the person to be killed probably has close associates,
"survivors," who will suffer harms and deprivations from the victim's death.
[d. at 838.
90. [d. at 839-41. Justice Souter's concurring opinion posed the following hypothetical
situation:
Assume that a minister, unidentified as such and wearing no clerical collar, walks
down a street to his church office on a brief errand, while his wife and adolescent
daughter wait for him in a parked car. He is robbed and killed by a stranger, and his
survivors witness his death. What are the circumstances of the crime that can be
considered at the sentencing phase under Booth? The defendant did not know his
victim was a minister, or that he had a wife and child, let alone that they were
watching. Under Booth, these facts were irrelevant to his decision to kill, and they
should be barred from consideration at sentencing. Yet evidence of them will surely
be admitted at the gUilt phase of the trial. The widow will testify to what she saw,
and, in so doing, she will not be asked to pretend that she was a mere bystander. She
could not succeed at that if she tried. The daughter may well testify too. The jury will
not be kept from knowing that the victim was a minister, with a wife and child, on an
errand to his church. This is so not only because the widow will not try to deceive the
jury about her relationship, but also because the usual standards of trial relevance
afford factfinders enough information about surrounding circumstances to let them
make sense of the narrowly material facts of the crime itself.
91. [d. at 848. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. [d. In an almost prophetic memorandum written by one of Marshall's law clerks to
the late Justice in the Booth case, it was advised that he should "[flight like hell on this one."
BENCH MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE MARSHALL re Booth v. Maryland at 7, March 24, 1987
(reproduced from the Thurgood Marshall Papers, Collections of the Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress). The clerk warned that "[Marshall's] prior rejection of retribution as a
justification for the death penalty, plus the risk of arbitrary results, should make this a close
case legally and morally for the right wingers." [d.
The memorandum's comments foreshadowed the extraordinary constitutional litigation
that followed the Booth case and the eventual "right wing" victory in Payne, particularly the
persistent efforts of the conservatives to reexamine the victim's impact issue. See infra
note III.
93. Payne, 501 U.S. at 851 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall referred to
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asserted that "[p]ower, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's
decisionmaking."94 Lamenting the possible future consequences of the
Court's decision, Justice Marshall wrote: "Cast aside today are those
condemned to face society's ultimate penalty. Tomorrow's victims may be
minorities, women, or the indigent. Inevitably, this campaign to resurrect
yesterday's 'spirited dissents' will squander the authority and the legitimacy
of this court as a protector of the powerless."95

several decisions at risk of being overruled as follows: Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547 (1990) (authority of Federal government to set aside broadcast licenses for minority
applicants); Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990) (First Amendment right
not to be denied public employment on the basis of party affiliation); Peel v. Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (First Amendment right to
advertise legal specialization); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990) (right under Double
Jeopardy Clause not to be subjected twice to prosecution for same criminal conduct);
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (due process right to procedural safeguards aimed at
assuring a voluntary decision to commit oneself to mental hospital); James v. Illinois, 493
U.S. 307 (1990) (Fourth Amendment right to exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
introduced for impeachment of defense witness); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)
(Eighth Amendment right to jury instructions that do not preclude consideration of
nonunanimous mitigating factors in capital sentencing); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149 (1987) (right to promotions as remedy for racial discrimination in government hiring);
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (Eighth Amendment right not to be executed if
insane); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986) (reaffirming right to abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973»;
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (Establishment Clause bar on governmental financial
assistance to parochial schools); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (First
Amendment right of public employee to express views on matter of public concern); Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment right of criminal
defendant to provide hypnotically refreshed testimony on his own behalf); Gray v.
Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987) (rejecting applicability of harmless error analysis to Eighth
Amendment right not to be sentenced to death by "death ·qualified" jury); Maine v. Moulton,
474 U.S. 159 (1985) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel violated by introduction of
statements made to government informant-codefendant in course of preparing defense
strategy); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (rejecting theory
that Tenth Amendment provides immunity to states from federal regulation); Pulliam v.
Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (right to obtain injunctive relief from constitutional violations
committed by judicial officials).
94. Payne, 501 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall warned that "the
continued vitality of literally scores of decisions must be understood to depend on nothing
more than the proclivities of the individuals whom now comprise a majority of this Court." /d.
at 851. See Ranae Bartlett, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: Eviscerating the Doctrine of Stare
Decisis in Constitutional Law Cases, 45 ARK. L. REV. 561 (1992).
95. Payne, 501 U.s. at 856 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The controversial dissenting opinion marked the end to Justice
Marshall's twenty-four year career as an associate justice of the Supreme
Court.96
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Blackmun,97 in which he described the majority's decision as representing "a
dramatic departure" from settled principles of capital sentencing
jurisprudence.98 He believed that the Payne decision could only be intended
to appeal to the "sympathies" and "emotions" of jurors, which had always
been patently improper in capital punishment cases.99 He wrote:
Irrelevant victim impact evidence that distracts the sentence from the proper
focus of sentencing and encourages reliance on emotion and other arbitrary
factors necessarily prejudices the defendant.
The majority's apparent inability to understand this fact is highlighted by its
misunderstanding of Justice Powell's argument in Booth that admission of
victim impact evidence is undesirable because it risks shifting the focus of
the sentencing hearing away from the defendant and the circumstances of the
crime and creating a '''mini-trial' on the victim's character." Booth found
this risk insupportable not, as today's majority suggests, because it creates a
"tactical" "dilemma" for the defendant, but because it allows the possibility
that the jury will be so distracted by prejudicial and irrelevant considerations
that it will base its life-or-death decision on whim or caprice. I 00

Justice Stevens made it clear that he believed that the underlying
premises upon which the Booth decision was based were constitutionally
96. Justice Marshall announced his retirement on the day that Payne was decided.
Although he did not publicly criticize his colleagues regarding Payne, popular accounts
suggest that the Payne decision left the Court's members angry and divided, and Justice
Marshall bitter. See DAVID G. SAVAGE, TuRNIlI!G RIGHT, THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST
SUPREME COURT 418-20 (1992). One Supreme Court observer went so far as to report that the
tone of the court was "rancor[ous]" and "insult[ing]" and that there was "blood on the
conference room floor ..." during the months prior to the final alignment in Payne being
reached. CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JUSTICE
THURGOOD MARSHALL 403 (1993). During this very tense period on the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist was described as "unaffected, and around the Court he was in an especially chipper
mood." SAVAGE, supra, at 408.
97. Payne, SOl U.S. at 856 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
98. [d.
99.
[d. at 858-59.
100. [d. at 864 (citations omitted).
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sound. Soon after the Payne decision was announced, many lower courts
anxiously embraced it. 10 1
The 6-3 Supreme Court vote in Payne ended the five years of
speculation regarding how long the controversial constitutional bar to victim
impact evidence would stand, in light of the changing personnel on the
Supreme Court. The addition of Justice Souter to the Court in 1990, who
sided with those overruling the Booth decision, combined with the retirement
of Justice Thurgood Marshall in 1991, on the day Payne was decided,
reinforced the continuing validity of victim impact evidence in capital cases.
The appointment of conservative Justice Clarence Thomas to the Supreme
Court as Marshall's replacement by President George Bush,102 combined
with the 1993 retirement of Justice Harry Blackmun, removed from the
Court another Justice who had voted in favor of the bar to victim impact
evidence in Booth .103

101. See Black v. Collins, 962 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1992) (prosecution argument that
victim was a hard-working devoted wife and mother was not inflammatory or fundamentally
unfair); Arizona v. Atwood, 832 P.2d 593 (Ariz. 1992) (the fact that 3,000 citizens marched
and burned a trailer where defendant slept was admissible victim impact evidence in a court
sentencing proceeding); Johnson v. Arkansas, 934 S.W.2d 179,189 (Ark. 1996) (argument to
jury suggesting that it punish the defendant for taking away the victim's mother's "right" to
watch her daughter grow up and marry); People v. Stanley, 897 P.2d 481, 523 (Cal. 1995)
(argument inviting jurors to compare sympathy for defendant's family with sympathy for the
victim's family was not improper); People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 881 (Cal. 1992)
(prosecution's argument requesting that the jury put the victim "in that casket" and put the
victim's family "around it" was not improper); People v. Johnson, 842 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1992) (not
improper for the prosecutor to refer to orphaned child or victim's desire for revenge); In re
Petition, 597 A.2d 1 (Del. 1991) (trial court precluded from refusing to consider whether it
would permit victim impact evidence, writ of mandamus issued to require trial court to abide
by the state statute); Hornick v. Nevada, 825 P.2d 600 (Nev. 1992) (argument that defendant
was responsible for the victim's child being without a mother was proper); Lucas v. Evatt,
416 S.E.2d 646 (S.C. 1992) (closing argument by prosecutor referring to the victim's seven
grandchildren was not fundamentally unfair under Payne).
102. Appointed by President Bush on October 18, 1991; took office on October 23,
1991. Justice Thomas has generally been unwilling to recognize the claims of capital
defendants before the Supreme Court. For a survey of Justice Thomas' capital punishment
jurisprudence, see Christopher E. Smith, The Constitution and Criminal Punishment: The
Emerging Visions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 593 (1995) (discussing
the conservative leanings of Justice Thomas in the area of the rights of criminal defendants in
general and capital punishment in particular).
103. Justice Blackmun retired in July 1993.
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Before Justice Blackmun left the Court, however, he issued a scathing
review of the fairness of capital punishment in Callins v. Collins .104 Justice
Blackmun reasoned that capital punishment could not be fairly administered
as it currently existed. 105 This view represented it departure from his earlier
capital punishment jurisprudence. 106 Justice Blackmun's retirement from the
Court left Justice John Paul Stevens as the only member of the Supreme
Court who had voted for exclusion of victim impact testimony in capital jury
cases. Even assuming that the newcomers to the Court, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg lO7 and Justice Stephen Breyer,IOS could be persuaded that Booth
was correct in excluding victim impact evidence, the current composition of
the Court leaves little doubt that a solid majority supporting the admission of
victim impact evidence remains for the foreseeable future. 109 It would also
104. 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (Blackmun, 1., dissenting). This case was a dissent from a
denial of a petition for writ of certiorari.
105. Justice Blackmun stated:
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. For more
than 20 years I have endeavored-indeed, I have struggled-along with a majority of
this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the
mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to
coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and
the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply
to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to
me now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can
save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies. The basic
question-does the system accurately and consistently determine which defendants
"deserve" to die?-cannot be answered in the affirmative.
Id. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106. Justice Blackmun endorsed capital punishment when he was initially appointed to
the Supreme Court and was one of the original dissenters in Furman v. Georgia, 40S U.S. 23S
(1972). He also endorsed as constitutional the 1976 trilogy of state capital punishment
statutory schemes. See discussion of Gregg v. Georgia, Proffitt v. Florida, and Jurek v. State,
supra note 26. However, his comments in Callins v. Collins, 501 U.S. at 1141 reflect a
dramatic departure from his earlier capital punishment position. For an excellent examination
of Justice Blackmun's change of heart, see D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., Justice Blackmun's
Eighth Amendment Pilgrimage, S B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 271 (1994) (describing Justice
Blackmun's capital jurisprudence from his career on the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
until his retirement from the Supreme Court). Professor Stephenson remarked that "few
justices in modem Supreme Court history have evidenced a more remarkable transformation
in constitutional jurisprudence." /d. at 320.
107. Appointed by President Clinton on August 3, 1993; took office on August 10,
1993.
lOS. Appointed by President Clinton on August 2, 1994; took office on September 30,
1994.
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appear unlikely that the Supreme Court would reverse itself twice on the
same issue in the period of a relatively few years ,1 10 especially after having
taken certiorari on the victim impact issue five times in the five years
between 1986 and 1991.111 The Payne decision appears to have made the
admissibility of victim impact information in capital jury sentencing, at least
as a matter of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, secure.

III. THE CASE FOR VICTIM IMPACT INFORMATION: THE ORIGIN AND
ApPROV AL OF THE MODERN VICTIM PARTICIPATION ApPROACH
Historically in Europe and England, prosecution of a criminal case had
not always been a strictly public matter. 112 However, the strain of the
expense of investigating and conducting a private prosecution exacted a
heavy financial burden on most victims, thus a system of public prosecution
became necessary. That system, where criminal matters are brought in the
name of the state rather than an individual citizen, has completely dominated
American criminal law and its institutions .113 One trade-off that has resulted

109. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter
voted in the majority in Payne, 501 U.S. at 810.
110. The Supreme Court has, on occasion, overruled a precedent soon after it was
announced. An example of the Supreme Court overruling a recent precedent is in West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling Minersville Sch.
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). The Court in Barnette overruled Gobitis' 8-1 decision
requiring that Jehovah's Witnesses salute the flag in public school. Some accounts of this
overruling suggest that widespread violence against Jehovah's Witnesses by public officials
and private citizens prompted the Court's change of heart since the Court's membership only
changed by two Justices. PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICfIONS 15-35 (1988).
See also Victor W. Rotnem & F.G. Folson, Jr., Recent Restrictions Upon Religious Liberty,
36 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 1053 (1942).
Ill. Not only was the victim impact issue addressed in Booth, Mills and Gathers, but
in Payne v. Tennessee, 498 U.S. 1080 (1991), the Supreme Court requested the issue of
overruling Booth be briefed although it had not been raised by either party. The Court also
granted, then dismissed, another petition on the issue of overruling Booth, in State v. Huertas,
553 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio 1990), cert. granted, 498 U.S. 957 (1990), and cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 498 U.S. 336 (1991).
112. Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims' Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937
(1985) (summarizing European and English experience evolving from a system of self help
and family vengeance to a system of public prosecution).
113. Phillip B. Kurland & D.W.M. Waters, Public Prosecutions in England 1854-79:
An Essay in English Legislative History, 1959 DUKE LJ. 493, 512 (1959).
"The 'criminal law' of Europe before the twelfth century was predominantly private.
Public officers did not search out and investigate crimes. Injuries were brought to the
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from the adoption of a public prosecution system has been marginalizing the
role of individual victims of crime in the criminal justice process; that is,
victims have been said to play only a "distinctly secondary role" in the
criminal justice system. I 14
One concern highlighting the shortcomings of the public prosecution
system is the perception of unequal treatment of victims when compared to
the advantages enjoyed by the criminally accused. Many resources are
routinely committed to aid offenders who have already exacted a cost on
society.115 The laws protecting the accused and the existence of
constitutional protections for criminal defendants were ultimately compared
to the relative absences of specific rights for victims of crime prior to the
early 1980's by victims' rights advocates. 116 The result of the tensions
between liberal criminal procedure reforms 117 and more conservative victimfocused concerns 118 contributed to the creation of the modem victims' rights
attention of the officials of justice by those who had suffered them, and it was the accuser's
responsibility to see that legal officers acted." EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 41 (1985).
114. Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution,
52 MISS. LJ. 515,519 (1982).
115. See Henderson, supra note 112 (collecting examples of financial programs to
rehabilitate offenders).
116. See E. VAN ALLEN, OUR HANDCUFFED POLICE: THE ASSAULT UPON LAW AND
ORDER IN AMERICA AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (1968).
117. The Warren Court initiated a number of criminal procedure reforms beginning
with the Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), principle of right to counsel. The
activism of the Warren years on the Court has been described "as one of the most creative and
daring periods in constitutional history." ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME
COURT 337 (1972). During that period, the Court had "undertaken to supervise more closely
than ever before our machinery of criminal law enforcement ...." /d. at 343.
Key to those reforms was the implementation of the right to counsel in several stages of
the criminal justice process. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (right to counsel
during police interrogation); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (right to counsel once
adversary proceeding has begun); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. I (1970) (preliminary
hearing is a critical stage requiring state to provide indigent counsel); Moore v. Illinois, 434
U.S. 220 (1977) (in court identification at a preliminary hearing requires counsel to protect
defendant's interest); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (pretrial post-indictment
line-up requires counsel); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel when a
defendant might be imprisoned for an offense); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to
counsel applies to juveniles when they might be committed to a state institution); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (if defendant has a first appeal as a matter of right under state
law, he is entitled to counsel); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to counsel at
probation revocation hearings).
118. One writer has gone so far as to suggest that the Supreme Court put "a premium
on lawlessness while it in effect penalizes the victim ...." E. V AN ALLEN, supra note 116, at

119.
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movement. The movement seeks to create specific rights to be enjoyed by
victims in the criminal process, even if establishing such participation
requires aggressive political action. Indeed, "[m]ost of the victim's rights
activity has been far from dispassionate, and currently, the victims rights
'movement' has a decidedly conservative bent."119
The political activity of the victims' rights movement resulted in the
commissioning of an influential report initiated by the Reagan
Administration entitled the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime. 120
The report extensively addressed the concerns of victims of crime and
proposed a host of solutions designed to promote equity in the criminal
justice systems from the victim's point of view. Many of the report's
recommendations also sought to remove substantive criminal process rights
already established by the Supreme Court. Among those recommendations

119.
120.

Henderson, supra note 112, at 951.
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME FINAL REPORT

(1982)

(recommendations for governmental agencies). In a statement from Lois Haight Herrington,
chairman of the Task Force, to President Ronald -Reagan, the goal and intentions of the
committee to move the criminal justice systems toward greater recognition of victims was
clearly explained:
Dear Mr. President:
When you established the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime on April 23,
1982, you led the nation into a new era in the treatment of victims of crime. Never
before has any President recognized the plight of those forgotten by the criminal
justice system-the innocent victims of crime.
In meeting the charge that you gave us, we reviewed the available literature on the
subject of criminal victimization; we interviewed professionals, both in and out of the
criminal justice system, who are responsible for serving victims; and, most
importantly, we spoke with citizens from around the country whose lives have been
altered by crime.
We found that the perception you shared when you gave us our charge is,
unfortunately, true. The innocent victims of crime have been overlooked, their pleas
for justice have gone unheeded, and their wounds-personal, emotional, and
financial-have gone unattended.
We also found that there is no quick remedy to the innocent victim's plight. Only the
sustained efforts of federal, state, and local governments, combined with the
resources of the private sector, can restore balance to the criminal justice system.
Citizens from all over the nation told us again and again how heartened they were
that this Administration has taken up the challenge, ignored by others in the past, of
stopping the mistreatment and neglect of the innocent by those who take liberty for
license and by the system of justice itself.
[d. at ii.

394

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:367

were suggestions to promote victim confidentiality,121 provide reasonable
counseling for violent crime victims and their families,122 pennit hearsay at
preliminary criminal hearings,123 reform the bail system,124 abolish the
exclusionary rule, 125 provide notice for parole hearings, 126 abolish parole
and judicial discretion at sentencing,127 increase criminal incident reporting
requirements at schools,128 provide for increased reporting of arrest records
of child abusers,129 require victim impact statements at sentencing,130 and
121. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to ensure that addresses of victims
and witnesses are not made public or available to the defense, absent a clear need as
determined by the court." [d. at 17.
122. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to ensure that designated victim
counseling is legally privileged and not subject to defense discovery and subpoena." [d.
123. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to ensure that hearsay is admissible
and sufficient in preliminary hearings, so that victims need not testify in person." [d.
124. The Task Force recommended that:
Legislation should be proposed and enacted to amend the bail laws to accomplish the
following:
a. Allow courts to deny bail to persons found by clear and convincing evidence to
present a danger to the community;
b. Give the prosecution the right to expedited appeal of adverse bail determinations,
analogous to the right presently held by the defendant;
c. Codify existing case law defining the authority of the court to detain defendants
as to whom no conditions of release are adequate to ensure appearance at trial;
d. Reverse, in the case of serious crimes, any standard that presumptively favors
release of convicted persons awaiting sentence or appealing their convictions;
e. Require defendants to refrain from criminal activity as a mandatory condition of
release; and
f. Provide penalties for failing to appear while released on bond or personal
recognizance that are more closely proportionate to the penalties for the offense with
which the defendant was originally charged.
[d.

125. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to abolish the exclusionary rule as it
applies to Fourth Amendment issues." [d.
126. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to open parole release hearings to
the public." [d. at 18.
127. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to abolish parole and limit judicial
discretion in sentencing." [d.
128. The Task Force suggested that:
Legislation should be proposed and enacted to require that school officials report
violent offenses against students or teachers, or the possession of weapons or
narcotics on school grounds. The knowing failure to make such a report to the police,
or deterring others from doing so, should be designated a misdemeanor.
[d.
129. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to make available to businesses and
organizations the sexual assault, child molestation, and pornography arrest records of
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expand victim employee assistance 131 and financial assistance programs .132
It is from this commission report and the movement supporting its adoption
that the modem "victims rights" movement can be traced. 133
However, the recognition of the victims rights movement has not been
exclusively legislative but also judicial. For example, the former Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, Warren Burger, noted that "[i]n the
administration of justice, courts may not ignore the concerns of victims."134
Justice Anthony Kennedy, prior to his elevation to the Supreme Court,
commented that steps to recognize the rights of victims are necessary "as a
simple matter of distributive justice, a decent and compassionate society
should recognize the plight of its victims and design its criminal system to
alleviate their pain, not increase it."135
prospective and present employees whose work will bring them in regular contact with
children." Id.
130. Legislation should be proposed and enacted to accomplish the following:
a. Require victim impact statements at sentencing;
b. Provide for the protection of victims and witnesses from intimidation;
c. Require restitution in all cases, unless the court provides specific reasons for
failing to require it;
d. Develop and implement guidelines for the fair treatment of crime victims and
witnesses; and
e. Prohibit a criminal from making any profit from the sale of the story of his crime.
Any proceeds should be used to provide full restitution to his victims, pay the
expenses of his prosecution, and finally, assist the crime victim compensation fund.
Id.
131. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to establish or expand employee
assistance programs for victims of crime employed by government." Id.
132. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to ensure that sexual assault victims
are not required to assume the cost of physical examinations and materials used to obtain
evidence." Id.
133. For state and federal legislative action, the Task Force also proposed that the
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution be amended to include the provision that: "the victim,
in every criminal prosecution shall have the right to be present and to be heard at all critical
stages of judicial proceedings." Id. at 114.
In support of its amendment, the Task Force explained, that in its view "[t]he victims of
crime have been transformed into a group oppressively burdened by a system designed to
protect them. This oppression must be redressed .... [T]he fundamental rights of innocent
citizens cannot adequately be perserved by any less decisive action.ld. at 114-15. See Carole
Mansur, Payne v. Tennessee: The Effect of Victim Harm at Capital Sentencing Trials and the
Resurgence of Victim Impact Statements, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 713,715-16 (1993).
134. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1,14 (1983).
135. Anthony Kennedy, Address at the Sixth South Pacific Judicial Conference (Mar.
3-5 1987), cited in George Nicholson, Victims' Rights, Remedies, and Resources: A Maturing
Presence in America, 23 PAC. LJ. 828 (1992).
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The movement has not only resulted in increased victim participation in
criminal cases by encouraging states to adopt victim impact statements at
sentencing,136 it has also spawned many recent successful state efforts to
ratify victim based constitutional amendments.1 37 Even federal law provides
136. Much of the political progress that was made during the early victims' rights
movement began with organized victim groups, such as the National Organization of Victim
Assistance (NOVA); additional groups, such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and
the Sunny von Bulow National Victim Advocacy Center, joined in the state by state
legislative battle for greater victim participation in the criminal process. Paul G. Cassell,
Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Cases for and the Effects of Utah's Victims' Rights
Amendment, 1994 UTAHL. REV. 1373, 1382-83.
137. See, as examples, the following victims' rights constitutional amendments and
related statutes:
(I)
ARIZ. CaNST. art. 2, § 2.1 (1996).
Arizona:
1991 Ariz. Legis. Servo 229 (West) (Enabling Legislation).
(2)
(3)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4401,4437 (1989) (Enabling
legislation)
California:

(I)
CAL. CaNST. Art. I, § 28 (1983).
(2)
CAL. PENAL CODE § 679 (West 1996) (Rights of victims
and Witnesses of Crime - originally enacted in' 1986).

Colorado:

COLO. CaNsT. Art. II, § 16a (1992).
(1)
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4.1-301-304 (Enabling legislation
(2)
enacted in 1992).

Florida:

(I)

(2)

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
1988 Fla. Laws ch. 88-96. (Enabling Legislation).

Illinois:

(1)
ILL. CaNST. art. I, § 8.1 (1992).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120/1-120/9 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (Bill
(2)
of Rights for Victims and Witnesses of Violent Crime - predates
constitutional amendment - originally enacted in 1984).

Kansas:

KAN. CaNST. art. 15, § 15 (1992).
(2)
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74.7333 (1989) (predates constitutional
amendment-originally enacted in 1989)

Maryland:

(I)

Michigan:

MICH. CaNST. art. I, § 24 (1988).
(1)
MICH. CaMP. LAWS § 780.751 (1996) (Crime Victim's
(2)
Rights Act-predates constitutional amendment-originally enacted
in 1985).

Missouri:

(I)

(I)

MD. CODE. ANN. art. 41, §§ 4-504(d), 4-511A (Michie
Supp.1996).

Mo. CONST. art. I, § 32 (1992).
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 595.200-595.218 (West 1986)
(Victim's
and
Witness'
Rights-predates
constitutional
amendment-originally
enacted in 1986).

(2)

New Mexico:

(I)

N.M. CaNST. art. II, § 24 (1992).
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for victim participation in the sentencing process: 138 The desire for victim
participation in the criminal process combined with the overwhelming
(2)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52:413-34 (1985) (Crime Victim's Bill
of rights-predates constitutional amendment-originally enacted in
1985).
Rhode Island:

(I)
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1986).
(2)
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-28-1-12-28-10 (1993) (Victim's Bill
of Rights-predates constitutional amendment-originally enacted
in 1983).

Texas:

(I)
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30 (1989).
(2)
TEX. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 56.01-56.12 (West 1985)
(Rights of Crime Victims-predates constitutional amendmentoriginally enacted in (1985).

Wash.:

(I)
WASH. CONST. (1983).
(2)
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.69.030 (1981) (Rights of Victims
and Witnesses of Crime-predates constitutional amendmentoriginally enacted in 1979).
Compilation of statutes cited in CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS FOR CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS
UPDATE, Victims Constitutional Amendment Network (1993). See also Jennifer G. Brown,
The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY LJ.
1247, 1255-56 (1994) (describing the history of the movement to amend state constitutions by
adding victim's rights amendments).
138. FED. R. CRIM. P. Rule 32(b)(4). The federal provision for victim impact
statements, as it appears in the amended version of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
32(b), reads as follows:
(4) CONTENTS OF THE PRESENTENCE REPORT. The presentence report must
contain -(A) information about the defendant's history and characteristics, including any
prior criminal record, financial condition, and any circumstances that, because they
affect the defendant's behavior, may be helpful in imposing sentence or in
correctional treatment;
(B) the classification of the offence and of the defendant under the categories
established by the Sentencing Commission under 28 U.S.C. § 994(a), as the
probation officer believes to be applicable to the defendant's case; the kinds of
sentence and the sentencing range suggested for such a category of defendant as set
forth in the guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission under 28 U.S.C. §
994(a)(I); and the probation officer's explanation of any factors that may suggest a
different sentence-within or without the applicable guideline-that would be more
appropriate, given all the circumstances;
(C) a reference to any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing
Commission under 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2);
(D) verified information, stated in a nonargumentative style, containing an
assessment of the financial, social, psychological, and medical impact on any
individual against whom the offense has been committed.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (b)(4)
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popular support for the death penalty has focused much attention on the
participation of victims in capital punishment cases .139
The recognition of victim participation in capital jury sentencing by the
Supreme Court in Payne established in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
what was implicit in the criminal justice system for centuries. Payne clarified
the position that the victims of a crime were entitled to see justice done
separate and apart from the legitimate obligation of the community to seek
punishment against the offender. 140 Prior to the existence of public
prosecution, private methods of punishment were well established
customs. 141 Indeed, simple vengeance as a goal of punishment has always
had some measure of support. 142 In our contemporary justice system, the
accommodation of private vengeance is more difficult to identify. Although,
we no longer tum over the murderer to the surviving family members, the
139. There is little doubt that most Americans support capital punishment in cases
involving a murder conviction. A recent poll published by Newsweek magazine in July 1995
reported that only 17% of those questioned opposed the death penalty in all cases. Of the
remaining 83% of the population, 31 % believed that persons convicted of murder in the
course of violent crime and major drug dealing should be executed; 28% of those surveyed
indicated that those convicted of brutal murder, mass murder and serial killings should be
subject to the death penalty. Tom Morganthau, Condemned to Life, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7,1995,
at 19.
In 1969, the approval rate for capital punishment was 51 %. Hazel Erskine, The Polls:
Capital Punishment, 34 PuB. OPINIONQ. 290, 291 (1970). A national Harris poll conducted in
1973 showed that 59% supported the penalty. Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., The Harris
Survey, New York, New York, June II and 14, 1973, CHIC. ThIB. (1973).
140. Ken Eikenberry, The Elevation of Victims' Rights in Washington State:
Constitutional Status, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 19 (1989) (arguing that the "pendulum" is swinging
back in favor of victims).
141. One writer believes that our contemporary legal system has removed individual
justice through vengeance from the criminal process. She writes, "[o]n an individual basis, the
vendetta and feud have been outlawed. They are deemed atavistic relics of more barbarous
ages: men and women are supposed to refrain from taking vengeance on their enemies no
matter what the provocation and instead tum to the law for justice and satisfaction." LOIS G.
FORER, A RAGE TO PuNISH 97 (1994). Forer's observation does not, however, conform to the
current desire of victims to participate. If the only way a victim may express their desire for
revenge is within the courthouse walls, then victim impact information becomes the only
alternative to private vengeance if a victim is to be heard individually at all. For many
victims, a response from the prosecutor, acting as a representative of the people, is woefully
inadequate to satisfy their sense of justice.
142. It has been said that the public demand for the death penalty, as public vengeance
or retribution, has gained new respectability. William P. Barr, U.S. Attorney General under
the Bush Administration, declared that a deserved execution creates "a moral satisfaction in
the community, and I think that's justified." [d. at 10 1.
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victim's concern for personal vengeance is not totally ignored in our public
prosecution system.
Indeed, victim participation as a vehicle for recognition of private
vengeance in the system is well illustrated by a statement adopted as part of
the victim's task force report.1 43
Although the means by which private vengeance is taken into account by
the use of victim impact information may be subtle, the objective is clear.
The goal is to enhance the punishment of the offender. l44 Even if that
punishment is the ultimate sanction of death.145 The legal, social and moral
forces of the vengeance driven, victim participation model of imposing
punishment cannot be ignored.
Proponents of a victim participation model have advanced many
compelling arguments. Many of those arguments were identified throughout
the opinions of the Justices joining the majority in Payne. 146 Legal and
historical considerations alone, however, only tell part of the story of the
victims right movement. Emotional considerations and recognition of the
victim's personal suffering play a major role in understanding why the
victims rights movement demands the need for direct victim participation.
One commentator has noted that the victims rights movement attempts to
respect

143. TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 120, at 78.
The goal of victim participation is not to pressure justice, but to aid in its attainment.
The judge cannot take a balanced view if his information is acquired from only one
side. The prosecutor can begin to present the other side, but he was not personally
affected by the crime or its aftermath, and may not be fully aware of the price the
victim has paid. It is as unfair to require that the victim depend solely on the
intercession of the prosecutor as it would be to require that the defendant rely solely
on his counsel.
,/d.

144. A principal justification for capital punishment has been to impose retribution for
the criminal act. Retribution and vengeance are closely linked with vengeance being more
personal to the victims. One of my colleagues has written, "[r]etribution, or just deserts, seeks
to punish an offender for the act committed commensurate with the harm inflicted and the
moral wrongfulness of the act. Retribution i,s retrospective in that it punishes for what was
done without any regard to possible future benefits arising out of the punishment." Steven
Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court's Tortured
Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 Ky. LJ. 107, 162-63 (footnotes omitted)
(1995-96). It is often difficult to tell whether victims or victims' groups advocate retribution,
vengeance, or both.
145. See supra notes 141-42.
146. See supra notes 54-90.
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subjective experiences and feelings of victims and for their need to tell their
own stories. There is also a calculated judgment that the sentencer who hears
from the victim or the victim's family will find the victims suffering more
reason to hold the defendant responsible and thus will sentence more
stringently,147

Some have gone so far as to suggest that the victim impact statement
marks the resurgence of vengeance by victims and families through the
criminal justice system since direct victim participation in the courtroom
provides an alternative to vigilante justice. 148
All victim participation, however, is not motivated by vengeance. Two
compelling reasons unrelated to retribution are frequently advanced by
victims groups. First, that participation in the process helps the victim regain
a sense of control over their lives. 149 This "self help therapy" is a favorable
alternative to simply feeling vulnerable and devastated by the effect of the
criminal act on one's life. Second, victim participation is said to enhance the
efficiency of the criminal justice system through increased victim
participation and thus encourages future involvement of victims in' solving
crime. 150
Notwithstanding the concerns for more balance in the system and the
therapeutic value of victim participation, it is difficult to separate the
147. Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1416 (1993).
148. See Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 77,
92-93 (1992). All do not agree that victim participation has a healing or therapeutic effect.
"Vengeance and anger are intertwined, and while victims' anger at the criminal who
victimized them is justifiable, vengeance as a manifestation of that anger has a questionable
psychological value to the victim." Michael I. Oberlander, Note, The Payne of Allowing
Victim Impact Statements at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1621, 1653
(1992). See also Henderson, supra note 112, at 994-95.
149. Maureen McLeod, Victim Participation at Sentencing, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 501,
504 (1986); Oberlander, supra note 148, at 1624-25.
Roberta Roper, one of the nation's leading victims rights advocates, has noted that
"[wJhen you become a crime victim, all the controls in your life are gone. But letting victims
make choices returns some of the control." Patrick McGuire, Fighting for the Rights Cause,
BALTIMORE SUN, February 28,1994, at DI, D2.
150. McLeod, supra note 149, at 506. The routine disregard for victims and witnesses
in the process, even scheduling matters, has unfortunate consequences. For example, a firstyear law student in my class who was a crime victim requested two excused absences because
she was summoned as a witness in a criminal case. She was frustrated by the prosecutor's last
minute contact and numerous changes in the court date. After her experience in that case, she
said that the lack of efficiency in the system would make her reluctant to participate in the
future.
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demands for increased victim participation from the desire for proportional
retributive punishment. All else being equal, many still embrace the view
that punishment should be proportionally allocated according to the harm
inflicted by the wrongdoer. 151 A logical extension of allocating adequate
punishment in comparison to the harm caused by an offender supports the
conclusion that in cases of capital murder the surviving victim's desire for
the defendant to be executed must be considered. To do otherwise would
jeopardize the public prosecution system's effort to retain its legitimate place
in our law enforcement scheme. Thus, it has been said that "capital
punishment for murder exerts a moral influence by indicating that life is the
most highly protected value."152 It would seem that if it is legitimate that a
death penalty exists at all,153 it should be the legally recognized substitute
for private vengeance. That is, victim impact should be considered as part of
a system of public punishment which is an adequate substitute for citizens
taking matters of punishment into their own hands .154
Proponents of capital punishment fervently contend that "society has not
only the right, but the affirmative duty, to enact the supreme penalty from
foul and vicious killers."155 The public has a desire to see severe punishment
for serious crimes. This phenomena is referred to by one observer as "the
boundless outrage that generates demands for boundless retribution."156

151. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 34 (1987).
152. Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 949,967 (1966).
153. For arguments citing reasons for opposition to capital punishment, see infra notes
287-92.
154. Even opponents of capital punishment can understand and sympathize with the
pain that causes many loved ones of murder victims to call for the death of the killer.
In some ancient societies, it was left to the families of the dead person to exact a
price for the wrong that had been done to them-whether that price was an economic
penalty or "a life for a life." Punishment by the state is, in an essential way, a
substitute for personal vengeance. It was meant not only to replace it, but to
supersede it.
MICHAEL KRONENWETIER, CAPITAL PuNISHMENT: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 34 (1993).
155. FRANK G. CARRINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 18 (1978). Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once commented that, "[i]f people would gratify the passion of revenge
outside of the law, if law did not help them, the law has no choice but to satisfy the craving
itself ...." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 36 (Little, Brown & Co. 1963)

(1881).
156.

SUSAN JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE: THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE 289 (1993).
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Even without conclusive evidence that capital punishment deters
crime,157 many people desire that it remain an option. Some citizens believe
that the penalty is at least necessary to establish that some behavior is
intolerable. Without the penalty, it has been argued that victims will lose
confidence that someone will "act on their behalf . . . ."158 The criminal
justice system could lose its power as the only legitimate authority to enforce
the law. For example, one writer fears that "[aJ society that is unable to
convince individuals of its ability to enact atonement for injury is a society
that runs a constant risk of having its members revert to wilder forms of
justice." 159
With violent crime on the rise, most people are unlikely to stop
pressuring the justice system to punish offenders severely or execute them
when it seems appropriate. In such a climate it is certainly naive to suggest
that victims of homicide or other violent crimes would desire, for the sake of
the criminally accused, to abandon their participation in the sentencing
process.
As one commentator has observed,
[t]he average citizen is not minded to become a killer; nor does he lose much
sleep over the possibility of being falsely accused of murder, such situations
being rare. What he is worried about is becoming a victim. As crime has
proliferated in this country, the average citizen has watched the statistical
chances of becoming the victim of violent crime grow drastically, and he
does not like it. 160
As crime has increased it is not illogical to believe that the trend for a
more active role of the victims will increase. Political pressure on judges,
prosecutors and other elected officials to recognize the need for victims to
participate in punishing the offender will continue to have a profound effect
on all aspects of the criminal justice system.

157.

Whether the death penalty has a deterrent effect has lead to considerable debate.

See, e.g., Isaac Erhlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life or
Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975) (arguing the deterrent effect of capital punishment).
But see WILLIAM J. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 137-47 (1974) (arguing the absence of

deterrence and criticizing Erhlich's reSUlts).
158. JACOBY, supra note 156) at 5.
159. Jd. at 10.
160. CARRINGTON, supra note 155, at 20.
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IV. A CRITIQUE OF PAYNE AND THE PROBLEMS IT PRESENTS

Despite the compelling case that can be made for victim participation
and the obvious political muscle which supports initiatives to increase and
protect victim participation, the Payne decision presents several challenges
that cannot be ignored by the courts for very long. The Supreme Court's
decision in Payne has opened the door to victim participation in capital jury
sentencing and has not placed many tangible limits on that participation.
Payne has made it clear that the impact on the victim's family in a homicide
case may be considered by a sentencing jury on the theory that it is simply
relevant to evaluating the appropriate punishment. 161 As a practical matter
its general relevance and admissibility is, for the most part, a closed legal
question. 162 Other than a possible Due Process challenge to some potential,
but as of yet, unspecified inflammatory use of victim impact information l63
and a conspicuous silence on whether a victim could actually recommend a·
sentence of death to the jury,l64 the Payne opinion places few limitations on
what a victim may say. Furthermore, the question of who qualifies as a
"victim" presents problems of its own. 165 For example, should the testimony
be limited to immediate family or, in absence of a statute, could anyone
acquainted with the victim be able to offer testimony about how the crime
and the loss of the victim has affected their life?166
See supra notes 79-82.
See supra note Ill.
See Jonathan H. Levy, Note, Limiting Victim Impact Evidence and Argument
v. Tennessee, 45 STAN. L. REV. \027 (1993).
164. See State v. Bolton, 896 P.2d 830 (Ariz. 1995) (recommendation of sentence by
surviving victim can be improper, but was harmless in this case).
165. The Supreme Court opinions on victim impact statements are virtually silent on
the scope of those persons who would qualify as appropriate surviving victims. Katie Long,
Community Imput at Sentencing: Victim's Rights, Victim's Revenge, 75 B.UL REV. 187
(1995). Payne v. Tennessee does not suggest it should be limited to family members. /d. at
199. One commentator has argued that Payne supports the proposition that community impact
testimony will become a fixture in the criminal justice process. Id. at 229. Such an approach
would involve testimony of a community representative at the sentencing hearing describing
the loss of the victim to the sentencer in terms of loss to the community. Id. at 195-96.
166. One court recently interpreting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987),
described the potential range of victim impact testimony very broadly. See Nooner v. State,
907 S.W.2d 677 (Ark. 1995) ("[T]estimony may range from the victim's family to those close
to that person who were profoundly impacted by his death ...."). However, the trial judge in
the celebrated death penalty case of Susan Smith refused to permit a police officer to testify
about the emotional impact they experienced when recovering the bodies of her dead children
from the water and the impact on people who were around at the time. State v. Smith, No. 94161.
162.
163.
After Payne

404

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:367

It could be argued that everyone in the community is affected by the
death of one of its members. Does the language of Payne support the notion
that co-workers and close friends would be able to offer their reflections on
the decency of the victim and how his or her loss will affect the workplace or
the community? And if such reflections are allowed, and surviving victims
can presumably influence the decision of a jury to impose death, then what
. result for the person murdered without surviving victims able to offer victim
impact? Does absence of spokespersons result in a lesser influence in the
criminal justice system?167 One comment has suggested that such a ranking
of victims is a violation of equal protection of the law. 168
Arguably, if the victim's value to society is truly relevant in sentencing
capital defendants, there would be no reason why a prosecutor could not
survey all people who knew the victim to obtain the most accurate
information on the kind of person the victim was and how valuable the
community believed him or her to be. 169 Such cases have yet to come before
the Supreme Court but it is likely that a broader definition of victim impact
information might be pursued by a prosecutor if a victim was particularly
renowned. For example, if a doctor who discovered a cure for AIDS was
murdered, the value of his contribution to society certainly adds to the
impact of the crime on people beyond his immediate family. Taking the
point a step further, what if a researcher was murdered just before she was
able to complete the final step in the cure for cancer? Could it not be said

65-44-906 and 94-65-44-907, 1995 WL 702707, at *8 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Tr. July 26,
1995». The South Carolina jury ultimately refused to render a death sentence. Morganthau,
supra note 139.
167. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506.
168. See Jonathan Willmott, Comment, Victim Characteristics and Equal Protection
for the Lives of All: An Alternative Analysis of Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v.
Gathers and a Proposed Standard for the Admission of Victim Characteristics in Sentencing,
56 BROOK. L. REV. 1045 (1990).
169. The majority in Booth feared valuing and comparing one life over another. See
supra note 29. Some commentators argue that since such comparisons are inevitable,
mathematic formulas should be devised to accomplish the task. See Teree E. Foster, Beyond
Victim Impact Evidence: A Modest Proposal, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 1305, 1312 (1994) (arguing
for use of calibrated scales assigning point value to the loss felt by victim to determine victim
level of participation in the punishment, and also suggesting the notion that "all persons have
equal worth is irrational and unrealistic . . . ."; see also David D. Friedman, Should the
Characteristics of Victims and Criminals Count?: Payne v. Tennessee and Two Views of
Efficient Punishment, 34 B.C. L. REV. 731 (1993) (developing a formula of "low value" and
"high value" victims in order to establish appropriate punishment for a particular killing).
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that all persons who may have benefited from her near completed work are
victims who have suffered loss from her death?170
The problem of making victim impact information relevant to capital
sentencing is that it potentially opens the "Pandora's box" of possibilities for
a prosecutor seeking a death sentence. How far can the prosecution push to
establish the good character of the victim? Can he submit work performance
evaluations, recorded testimonials, funeral eulogies, or even a high school
report card, in an effort to demonstrate the loss to the family and the
community? May the victim's yearbooks, family photo albums or concert
performance tapes be submitted as well? If such material is not prohibited in
a capital sentencing proceeding, under Payne, absent specific statutory
prohibitions, what legal principle prevents such information from being
considered? 171
Whatever the legitimate criticism of the Booth exclusion of victim
impact evidence may be, the decision at least had the advantage of offering a
bright line approach to the appropriate treatment of such information .172
Booth clearly mandated that the admission of such information in a capital
case l73 was reversible constitutional error. The rule in Booth made it clear all
efforts to have the jury overtly consider the worth of individual defendants or

170. See Long, supra note 165, at 207-08 (arguing for the variety of ways to view the
community as victim).
171. In Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223, 250 (Md. 1995), a ninety-second piano
performance videotape of the victim was played to the jury during the sentencing phase.
Jamie Griffin, the victim, was a gifted piano player and the videotape was held not cumulative
even though his parents testified about his piano playing ability.ld. at 250-51. Another court
held that there was nothing improper about a prosecutor's argument suggesting what parents
and friends "might" have said about the victim. State v. Gregory, 459 S.E.2d 638, 673-74
(N .C. 1995). See also Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1995) (an officer testifying about
the death of a fellow officer and its effect on children in the community was improper, but
harmless); State v. Scales, 655 So. 2d 1326 (La. 1995) (prosecutor's argument that he could
have called "dozens" of victim impact witnesses held not reversible error).
172. The Supreme Court has, in other contexts, announced "bright line" rules to avoid
uncertainty. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), the Court issued a "bright line"
rule that permitted police to order the driver out of the car even without the officer needing
reasonable suspicion to do so. The policy advanced for such a rule was that police should not
need to guess about when they could make such a request since serious issues of safety arise
in vehicle stops. Such rules add stability to the law and generally lead to uniform conduct.
See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (if police obtain a warrant, searches will
be upheld even if the facts in the warrant do not constitute probable cause).
173. Courts would sometimes avoid the consequences of Booth by holding that the
victim impact evidence was harmless. See, e.g., State v. Paz, 798 P.2d I, 15-17 (Idaho 1990),
cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259 (1991).
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victims would be highly suspect. This reduced the risk that a death sentence
would be rendered because of the victim rather than the background of the
offender or the crime. 174 The consequence of permitting victim impact
information is the risk that the victim and consequences of the crime might
dominate the jury's consideration of a death sentence .175 Sentencing
hearings might ultimately evolve into presentations of "the worth of the
victim," that would resemble those issues that sometimes arise in tort
litigation. 176 Indeed, if the Constitution presents no impediment to the use of
victim impact information other than the due process clause, and if such
information is considered generally relevant as Payne suggests, than there
would be no reason that a legislative body could not only permit, but require
greater victim participation than is presently recognized in most states .177
174. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983).
175. See Elizabeth Anna Meek, Comment, Victim Impact Evidence and Capital
Sentencing: A Casenote on Payne v. Tennessee, 52 LA. L. REV. 1299, 1310 (1992) ("Even if
it was relevant in a particular case, by its nature, [victim impact] evidence is unduly
prejudicial.").
176. Valuing life and loss of enjoyment is not only common in tort litigation but in
some cases necessary for recovery of damages. In federal law, recovery for loss of the
pleasure of living is actionable under § 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. An
English court required damages be allowed for the "loss of expectation of life." See Rose v.
Ford, [1937] A.C. 826,836. Recently, the Supreme Court unanimously held that damages for
"loss of the enjoyment of life" were allowable compensation under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. Molzof v. United States, 499 U.S. 918 (1992). Such valuation of life has come to be
known as "Hedonic Damages." See Anderson v. Nebraska Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 538 N.W.2d
732,739 (Neb. 1995) (hedonic damages are those damages awarded for loss of enjoyment of
life, and are measured separate from economic productive value that an injured person would
have had); Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), affd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir.
. 1987) (testimony of expert held admissible to assist jury in "determining the most accurate
and probable estimate of ... the hedonic value of [decedent's] life"). Some jurisdictions have
developed doctrine which permits recovery on the direct valuation on this type of loss. See,
e.g., Rufino v. United States, 829 F.2d 354, 362 (2d Cir. 1987) (comatose plaintiff without
cognitive awareness to recover for the "loss of enjoyment of life as separately compensable
items of damages"). See also Patrick B. Murray, Hedonic Damages: Properly a Factor Within
Pain and Suffering Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 37 (1989) (arguing the
continuing validity of Sherrod concerning hedonic damages). Arguably, these doctrines
already provides a legally adequate basis to introduce specific evidence of the value of the
victim's life and the loss of the enjoyment of that life to the surviving victim and his family,
especially in light of Payne's holding that the victim's loss is relevant to sentencing and
legislative willingness to permit more victim participation. But see Wilt v. Buracker, 443
S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2137 (1994) (testimony of expert regarding
hedonic damages not permitted); Southlake Limousine & Coach, Inc. v. Brock, 578 N.E.2d
677 (Ind. App. 1991) (rejecting recovery of hedonic damages).
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How far individual states will broaden the victim participation remains to be
seen. A state may place limits on those eligible to participate in capital
sentencing proceedings, but reforms that would limit victim participation are
unlikely to garner much political support. 178
The problem, however, only begins with determining the categories of
victims eligible to participate. It is still unclear what victims can tell the jury
about the deceased,179 how much detail the survivors can use to describe the

177. In fact, political support for victim's rights reform come from victim's rights
advocates who have succeeded in passing some form of victim impact legislation in 49
jurisdictions, permitting victim participation in both capital and noncapital contexts. See
Carrie L. MUlholland, Note, Sentencing Criminals: The Constitutionality of Victim Impact
Statements, 60 Mo. L. REV. 731 n.74 (1995) (collecting victim impact statement statutes
currently in effect).
In April, 1996, a victim's Bill of Rights constitutional Amendment was introduced to
Congress which would provide as follows:
Victims' Rights Constitutional Amendment
Section I. To ensure that the victim is treated with fairness, dignity, and respect,
from the occurrence of crime of violence and other crimes as may defined by law
pursuant to section two of this article, and throughout the criminal, military, and
juvenile justice processes, as a matter fundamental rights to liberty, justice. and due
process, the victim shall have the following rights: to be informed of and given the
opportunity to be present at every proceeding in which those rights are extended to
the accused or convicted offender; to be heard at any previously negotiated plea, or a
release from custody; to be informed of any release or escape; and to a speedy trial, a
final conclusion free from unreasonable delay, full restitution from the convicted
offender, reasonable measures to protect the victim from violence or intimidation by
the accused or convicted offender, and notice of the victim's rights.
Section 2. The several States, with respect to a proceeding in a State forum, and
the Congress with respect to a proceeding in a United States forum, shall have the
power to implement further the rights established in this article by appropriate
legislation.
142 CONGo REC. S3795 (daily ed. April 22,1995) (statement of Senator Kyl).
178. One victim impact statute authorizes that "a victim who is incapacitated or
otherwise incompetent shall be represented by a parent or present legal guardian, or if none
exists, by a representative designated by the prosecuting attorney without court appointment
. . . ." WASH. REV. CODE § 7.69.040. Under the same statute, a survivor is defined as a
"spouse, child, parent, legal guardian, sibling or grandparent." /d. § 7.69.020.
179. Payne gives no guidance on what a victim may say, but implicit in its overruling
Booth is the suggestion by the Supreme Court that the extensive victim impact testimony
given in Booth might be constitutionally permissible. See Booth, 482 U.S. 496, 509-515
(1987).

408

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:367

effect of their 10ss,ISO and how the defendant can rebut such evidence in a
capital jury sentencing.
V. VICTIM IMPACT AND CONFRONTATION: THE BATTLE NOT WORTH
WINNING
There is no question that a capital defendant has the right to attack the
accuracy of information that is offered against him at his sentencing
hearing .ISI
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided Gardner v. Florida,182 which
recognized the right to due process and confrontation in capital sentencing
proceedings.IS3 In Gardner, the Supreme Court overturned a capital sentence
because the basis of a pre-sentence report was not made available to the
defendant in the time for him to rebut. 184 The plurality opinion reasoned that
imposing a death sentence "on the basis of information which [the defendant]
had no opportunity to deny or explain," violated due process. IS5 In the years
following Gardner, the Supreme Court decided several cases which
reaffirmed that principal. In Ake v. Oklahoma,IS6 the Court held that where
the state intends to present psychiatric evidence in a capital sentencing
proceeding the indigent defendant was entitled to the assistance of a
psychiatrist for his defense in order to provide him "a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense."IS7 Most recently, the Supreme
Court in Simmons v. South Carolina,188 held that a capital defendant was
entitled to a jury instruction explaining the availability of the sentencing
180. An example of one statute that provides a broad scope of potential victim impact
information permits "the victim or a survivor, individually or with the assistance of the
prosecuting attorney ... [to include] but is not limited to information assessing the financial,
medical, social, and psychological impact of the offense . . . ." WASH. REV. CODE §
7.69.020(4).
181. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (l94S) (under the Due Process Clause an
offender has the right to attack information at his sentencing that is inaccurate). The American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code Section on Capital Punishment, while not endorsing capital
punishment, suggested that any capital statute provide that the defendant's counsel be
accorded a fair opportunity to rebut evidence offered by the prosecution at a death penalty
sentencing proceeding. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2) (1985).
IS2. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
183. [d. at 350-51.
184. [d. at 353.
185. [d. at 362.
186. 470 U.S. 68 (l9S5).
187. [d. at 83-87.
18S. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
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alternative of life without the possibility of parole, in order to rebut the
State's suggestions that the defendant would be a danger in the future.
Embracing Gardner, the Court's opinion reasoned that "the Due Process
Clause does not allow the execution of a person on the basis of information
which he had no opportunity to deny or explain." I89
Of course, one of the principle vehicles to challenge evidence presented
by the state is the right to confrontation through cross-examination
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 190 The right to cross-examination,
described as "an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair
trial which is this country's constitutional goal,"191 was been made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 192 Accordingly,
the constitutional jurisprudence suggests that a capital defendant has a right
to attempt to confront victim impact information at a capital sentencing
proceeding .193
The right to confront does not, however, necessarily support the wisdom
of such a strategy. Indeed, one might accurately describe the enterprise of
attempting to attack the grief of a surviving victim or the background of a
deceased victim as a classic example of "Hobson's Choice."194 The law may
provide the basis to challenge the victims, but in most cases, a defense
attorney has no true choice but to accept what has been offered. Confronting
victims by cross-examination might anger the sentencing jury .195

189. [d. at 159 (citing Gardner, 430 U.S. at 349).
190. As it relates to confrontation, the Sixth Amendment provides "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him ...." U.s. CONST. amend. VI.
191. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
192. /d. at 406.
193. See generally Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,318 (1974) (cross-examination is
available to demonstrate bias and reliability of a witness and is a fundamental right).
194. The phrase "Hobson's Choice" originates from the writings of the English poet
and historian John Milton (1608-74). The expression refers to Thomas Hobson, a Cambridge
carrier and liveryman who had a "custom of letting out his horses in rotation, and not
allowing his customers to choose among them." THE OXFORD COMPANION TO ENGLISH
LITERATURE 465 (Margaret Drabble ed.) (5th ed. 1985).
195. In the context of victim impact information the opportunity to challenge the
character of the deceased or the impact of the crime on the victim in all but the most unusual
circumstances meets the traditional definition of Hobson's Choice. See supra note 194. That
is: "an apparent freedom to take or reject something offered when in actual fact no such
freedom exists: an apparent freedom of choice where there is no real alternative: the forced
acceptance of something whether one likes it or not . . . ." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1076 (unabridged. ed. 1966).
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The Booth Court addressed the issue of confrontation in its ill-fated
decision when it observed that "the defendant would have the right to crossexamin[ation] . . . but he rarely would be able to show that the family
members have exaggerated the degree of sleeplessness, depression, or
emotional trauma suffered."196 The Court also noted that an attack on the
deceased's character was equally unappealing.I 97
Consider an example of the problems of confronting victim impact
testimony that arose in the case of Lodowski v. State.I 98 Lodowski, a
Maryland death penalty case that proceeded Booth in addressing the issue of
victim impact, involved the robbery and murder of two men at a suburban
Washington D.C. mini mart.I 99 One of the victims was Minh Huong
Phamdo. Several witnesses offered victim impact statements including
Minh's 74-year-old grandmother. 200 In describing her loss in religious terms·
the victim impact statement expressed her belief "that when she passed away
her soul would wander aimlessly for her fIrst grandson [Minh] is not on earth
to worship her. Any other grandson who would take over the duty of
ancestor wor[s]hipping would not be as effective as Minh, the fIrst bom."201
Although the Court of Appeals reversed the death sentence on other
grounds 202 it analyzed the legislative intent in permitting the consideration
of victim impact evidence.203 In dicta intended to guide the lower court on
remand at resentencing the Court of Appeals said, "[w]e see no constitutional
impediment to the legislature's determination that victim impact statements
are relevant in a capital sentencing proceeding, and we bow to the legislative
judgment that such statements are relevant."204 However, in an opinion that
concurred in the judgment, but disagreed with the victim impact dicta, Judge
Harry A. Cole pointed out the confrontation dilemma When he queried:
"How can [the defendant] challenge any testimony that expresses
bereavement, religious harm, or infant sorrow? The defendant must remain
mute while the victim's family pleads for its 'pound of flesh.' "205
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Booth, 482 U.S. at 506.
[d. at 507.
490 A.2d 1228 (Md. 1985).
[d. at 1231.
[d. at 1269 (Cole, J., concurring).
/d.

202. The court remanded for a new sentencing hearing based upon the trial court's
improper denial of a motion to suppress Lodowski's statement. [d. at 1258.
203. [d. at 1252-1257.
204. [d. at 1253.
205. [d. at 1277 (Cole,J., concurring).
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The problem posed by the Judge Cole in Lodowski is sobering. There is
virtually no way for the defendant to attack the claims of family members
who assert their measure of emotional pain and surely no way to examine the
validity of the effect on one's afterlife. 206 For a defense lawyer representing
the capital defendant, questioning a grieving family member on either matter
would be suicide in most cases.
One commentator has suggested that if approached with caution, the
defense may consider contacting the family of the deceased in an effort to
mitigate victim impact evidence.207 Professor Randall Coyne argues:
Although a matter of extreme delicacy, the defense should consider
attempting to establish contact with the victim's family. The funeral director
may be able either to identify an approachable family spokesperson or to
establish contact with a priest, minister, or rabbi assisting the family during
their tragedy. Although the family's initial reaction may be to avoid any
contact with the defense attorneys, one should not automatically assume that
all family members will seek to have the client killed. 208
There are at least four problems with such an approach. First, as
Professor Coyne recognizes, the victim's opinion, that death is not an
appropriate sentence for the defendant, may not even be admissible. 209
Second, it is virtually impossible to cross-examine a bereaved victim.
How does one go about questioning a victim on matters regarding the extent
of the grief and suffering without generating more sympathy for the victims?
The result would be to move ones' client closer to execution. Even though it
may be difficult for a victim to substantiate early morning stomach aches and
late night tears, what defense attorney would dare attempt to establish the
inaccuracy of such claims on cross-examination? Only in a case where the

See supra note 202.
Randall Coyne, Inflicting Payne on Oklahoma: The Use of Victim Impact
Evidence During the Sentencing Phase of Capital Cases, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 589 (1992).
208. [d. at 613.
209. Professor Coyne notes that Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1987),
found inadmissible testimony of one of the victim's relatives' that she did not believe in the
death penalty. See Coyne, supra note 207, at 618-19, 622. Other courts have agreed with this
conclusion. See State v. Pirtle, 904 P.2d 245 (Wash. 1995) (a victim's testimony in opposition
to the death penalty is not mitigating, nor is it victim impact testimony, rather it is an
inappropriate recommendation of sentence).
206.

207.
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victim is hopelessly unworthy of sympathy could such an effort even be
contemplated. 210
Third, most victims are likely to be irritated by defense efforts to contact
them. Obviously, the obligation of the attorney to represent the capital
defendant places the loyalty of the attorney at odds with the victim's desire
for the defendant to be punished.211 The victim will no doubt understand the
attorney's role and may refuse to cooperate and at worst, the victim may well
become hostile and be more likely to demand more severe punishment. At
least one study has suggested this possibility.212
A final problem generated by attempts to contact the victim is the very
real risk that the defense lawyers will become part of the victim impact
against their own client. It is certainly not unreasonable to suggest that a
victim might become upset about the attempt of a defense attorney or his
representatives to contact the victim through a funeral director or a
clergyman as has been suggested by Professor Coyne? 13 The attorney's well
intentioned effort to diligently prepare his case may result in an embarrassing
mention of his efforts to contact the family by a victim in the victim impact
statement. Surely, attempts to approach the victim will, in most cases, place
an attorney representing a capital client between Scylla and Charybdis.214
Even more troubling is Professor Coyne's suggestion that victim impact
should be confronted by a direct comparison of the victim's life to that of the
defendant. He asserts: "Rebutting victim impact evidence requires a
210. See Payne v. Tennessee: An Eye for an Eye and Then Some, 25 CONN. L. REV.
205, 255 (1992) ("At capital sentencing, the jury has already convicted the offender of

murdering the victim. By attempting to impeach the testimony relating to the victim or
impugn the victim's character, the offender will only incense the jury.").
211. Obviously an attorney's obligation to his client must supersede all other concerns
that an attorney may have for the victim of the crime. "Undivided allegiance and faithful,
devoted service to a client are prized traditions of the American lawyer. It is this kind of
service for which the Sixth Amendment makes provision." Von Moltke v. Gillie, 332 U.S.
708,725-26 (1948) (footnotes omitted).
212. See John Hagan, Victims Before the Law: A Study of Victim Involvement in the
Criminal Justice Process, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317, 328 (1982) ("It may be that in
the process of attempting to prove the client's innocence the defense counsel aggravates
tensions between the victims and accused.").
213. See supra note 208.
214. In Greek mythology, two immortal monsters who tormented Greek mariners,
particularly the mythical character Odysseus. See HOMER, THE ILIAD AND THE ODYSSEY
(Samuel Butler trans., & Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). The monsters were said to be
positioned close to each other in the Straits of Messina in the Western Mediterranean making
it difficult to navigate a vessel between them. The monsters give poetic expression to the
dangers one faces when going into uncharted waters in an effort to rebut victim impact.
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thorough investigation of the background and life of the victim. If faced with
overwhelming evidence that the deceased had a loving family, the defense
attorney should compare her client's life to the victim's life."215
Such comparisons are wrought with danger as Justice Powell suggested
in his majority opinion in Booth. 216 As Powell noted:
The prospect of a "mini-trial" on the victim's character is more than simply
unappealing; it could well distract the sentencing jury from its
constitutionally required task-determining whether the death penalty is
appropriate in light of the background and record of the accused and the
particular circumstances of the crime.217
Since in a capital sentencing the defendant has already been convicted of
murder218 the comparison of his life to the life of almost any victim will be
dreadfully undesirable. Indeed, defense counsel may be unfairly compelled
to abandon all confrontation of the victims in an effort to have the jury
reflect as little on the suffering of the victims as possible or to recommend to
his client that there should be no jury at all.
VI. GUESS WHO'S COMING TO DINNER? RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE
UNINVITED CONSEQUENCES OF VICTIM IMPACT INFORMATION
The issue of racial discrimination against African Americans in capital
sentencing has presented one of the most perplexing problems of criminal
justice.219 Of course, problems in discrimination in the criminal justice

215. Coyne, supra note 207, at 614. Although I have strong reservations about a
strategy that would force a confrontation of character between the defendant and the surviving
victims, Professor Coyne is quite correct that in the rare instance when an attorney would
engage such a battle, he not do so blindly. More important, it may be that the nature of the
victim impact information received by counsel prior to trial allows the defendant and counsel
to agree that such a contest is best if held in front of a judge rather than a jury.
216. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506-07 (1987).
217. Id. at 507.
218. See supra note 210.
219. For two particularly insightful reviews of the problem of racial discrimination in
capital punishment, see Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE LJ.
420,439-43 (1988) (suggesting that jurors are influenced by the race of both the victim and
the defendant) and Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and
the Supreme Court, 10 I HARV. L. REV. 1388 (l988) (discussing historical disparities in
punishment between white and black).
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system have not been confined exclusively to persons of African descent. 220
The problem, however, has been more acute when African Americans are
defendants in capital cases and, as a result, the statistical data substantiating
the existence of racial bias is virtually unassailable. 221 Even the Supreme
220. The measure of justice received in this country has often been linked to racial,
ethnic or religious prejudice. In Maryland in 1717 ,laws were enacted that prohibited not only
blacks, but Indians and Mulattos from testifying in any case in which a Christian white person
was concerned. These provisions applied to such persons whether they were slave or free.
JEFFREY R. BRACKET[, THE NEGRO IN MARYLAND: A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTION OF SLAVERY
191 (1891) (Herbert B. Adams ed. 1969). Another Maryland report commissioned in the early
1960s observed that in the years 1936-1961 of the 122 persons sentenced to death in
Baltimore City about 80 percent of those executed were African-American. LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL COMMITTEE, REPORT ON CAPITAL PuNISHMENT, at 41 (October 3, 1962) cited in THE
REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE DEATH PENALTY: AN ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN MARYLAND: 1978-1993 (November 1993) (on file with Professor Edward A.
Tomlinson, Faculty Reporter to the Governor's Commission, at the Thurgood Marshall Law
Library at the University of Maryland School of Law) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION
REPORT].
In Virginia during the early 1800's, negroes were not even permitted to testify in murder
trials against a white defendant. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & F. Michael Higginbotham,
"Yearning to Breathe Free": Legal Barriers Against and Options in Favor of Liberty in
Antebellum Virginia, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1213, 1239-40 n.l42 (l993).
In the mid-1800s a California court overturned the conviction of a white man charged
with murdering a Chinese woman since the testimony suggesting guilt was supported in part
by the testimony of a Chinese witness. People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 {I 854). The court reasoned
that the statute preventing "blacks," "mulattos," and Indians from testifying against whites
also applied to Chinese since the statute was designed to protect whites from testimony of all
nonwhites. See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical
Race Theory. Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1291 n.241
(1993).
In 1913, the oft-noted case of Leo Frank occurred. Frank, the Jewish victim of a Georgia
mob, was falsely accused of murdering Mary Phagan, a thirteen-year-old girl who worked for
him in an Atlanta factory. That Frank was Jewish arguably played a role in the decision of the
mob to act. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PuNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 191
(1993).
Native Americans were victims of the greatest single day of mass governmentsanctioned execution in United States history. A military commission tried nearly 400 Dakota
Indians and executed 38 after a small war between the Dakotas and white settlers. [d. at 97
(citing Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Justice, 43
STAN. L. REV. 13 (1990».
221 . Even the Supreme Court has recognized that racial discrimination "still remains a
fact of life, in the administration of justice as in our society as a whole. Perhaps today that
discrimination takes a form more subtle than before. But it is not real or less pernicious."
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,558-59 (1979). See also McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
286 (l987) (citing a study conducted by Professors David C. Baldus, George Woodworth and
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Court in McCleskey v. Kemp222 could not ignore the obvious statistical
disparity, particularly when the victim is white and the defendant is AfricanAmerican. 223 In McCleskey, a sharply divided Supreme Court held 5-4 that
despite the racial disparity generated by the statistical studies, McCleskey, an
African American, could not make out a sufficient claim to invalidate his
death sentence on equal protection grounds. 224
Ironically, Justice Lewis Powell, who not only authored the Court's
opinion in McCleskey, but who also crafted the Booth decision, reported in a
1991 interview that McCleskey should have been decided differently and that
he would no longer favor capital punishment if he were still on the Supreme
Court.225 The controversy race and capital punishment has generated has led
to recent unsuccessful efforts to pass laws in both federal and state
legislatures to mitigate the effect of discrimination by placing the burden on
the prosecution to show that seeking a death sentence is not based on racial
considerations.226

Charles Pulaski); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 39
(1984).
222. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
223. [d. at 286-87.
224. [d. at 299 (McClesky also challenged his sentence on 8th Amendment grounds).
225. In an interview with his former law clerk, Professor John C. Jeffries, Jr. of the
University of Virginia Law School, Justice Powell was asked whether he would change his
vote in any case. He responded:
"Yes, McCleskey v. Kemp,"
"Do you mean you would now accept the argument from statistics?"
"No, I would vote the other way in any capital case."
"In 'any' capital case?"
"Yes"
"Even Furman v. Georgia?"
"Yes, I have come to think that capital punishment should be abolished."
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. AND THE ERA OF JUDICIAL BALANCE 45152 (1994).
226. A federal bill known as the Racial Justice Act (H.R. 4017), intended to amend
title 28 of the United States Code and to prevent racial discrimination in capital sentencing,
was reported on favorably by the House of Representatives on March 24,1994. H.R. 4017,
103 Cong., 2d Sess. (1993). The report's purpose clause stated that the law would allow a
court consider evidence that established "a consistent pattern of racial discriminatory death
sentences in the sentencing jurisdiction, taking into account the nature of the cases being
compared, the prior records of the offenders, and other statutorily appropriate non-racial
characteristics." H.R. REP. No. 103-458, at 1 (1993). The relevant provisions of the statute
provided that:
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Prohibition against the execution of a sentence of death imposed on the
basis of race
(a) IN GENERAL. No person shall be put to death under color of State or
Federal law in the execution of a sentence that was imposed based on race.
(b) INFERENCE OF RACE AS THE BASIS OF DEATH SENTENCE. An inference that
race was the basis of a death sentence is established if valid evidence is presented
demonstrating that, at the time the death sentence was imposed, race was a
statistically significant factor in decisions to seek or to impose the sentence of death
in the jurisdiction in question.
(c) RELEVANT EVIDENCE. Evidence relevant to establish an inference that race
was the basis of a death sentence may include evidence that death sentences were, at
the time pertinent under subsection (b), being imposed significantly more frequently
in the jurisdiction in question(1) upon persons of one race than upon persons of another race; or
(2) as punishment for capital offenses against persons of one race than as
punishment for capital offenses against persons of another race.
(d) VALIDITY OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED To EsTABLISH AN INFERENCE. If
statistical evidence is presented to establish an inference that race was the basis of a
sentence of death, the court shall determine the validity of the evidence and if it
provides a basis for the inference. Such evidence must take into account, to the extent
it is compiled and publicly made available, evidence of the statutory aggravating
factors of the crimes involved, and shall include comparisons of similar cases
involving persons of different races.
(e) REBUTTAL. If an inference that race was the basis of a death sentence is
established under subsection (b), the death sentence may not be carried out unless the
government rebuts the inference by a preponderance of the evidence. Unless it can
show that the death penalty was sought in all cases fitting the statutory criteria for
imposition of the death penalty, the government cannot rely on mere assertions that it
did not intend to discriminate or that the cases in which death was imposed fit the
statutory criteria for imposition of the death penalty.
Id.at 12-13.
The federal provision failed in the Senate. 1994-95 CONGo Q. ALMANAC-1994, 103d
Congo (2d Sess.) 282 (1995). Among the criticisms of the proposed law was the notion that
the act offends notions of individual justice. The dissenting views to H.R. 4017 argued that
the criminal justice process is designed to allow the jury to carefully consider a number of
factors-which do not easily lend themselves to statistical quantification.ld. at 14-17.
The purpose of individualized justice is to ensure that each defendant has his or her
case carefully decided on its own merits-without regard to other defendants. The
Racial Justice Act would create a system of statistically proportional justice where
the penalty received would depend on ones [sic] membership or the membership of
ones [sic] victim in a particular racial class.
/d. at 16.
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When the victims are white, historically a black defendant is treated
more harshly.227 Throughout the post-civil war era African Americans were
exposed to "summary justice" in the form of lynchings. 228 A primary
motivation for this form of violent proceeding was the nature of the crime as
it related to the status of the victim. 229 This history of bias may be the
unwelcome factor in the continuing statistical disparity that exists in the
imposition of capital punishment. Some studies demonstrate that African
Americans do commit crime at a higher rate compared to their relative
numbers in the population. 230 But even that fact does not explain the
profound effect that the race of the victim 231 has in predicting who will be
executed and who will be spared. 232 Several studies conducted during the
227. A 1849 Virginia law made it a crime to use "provoking language or menacing
gestures" to a white person. The law applied to both free blacks and slaves. Code Va. 1849,
tit. 54, chap. 200, § 8, p. 754 (cited in FRIEDMAN, supra note 220, at 90 & n.28).
228. JOHN H. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO
AMERICANS 439 (3d ed. 1967). Between 1889 and 1922, there were 3,436 lynchings in the
United States. ld. at 488.
229. Lynching as a form of alternative system of justice has been explored by legal
scholars. One scholar has commented that the race of the victim of the alleged offense (in
most cases white women) motivated vigilante action from those too angry or too impatient to
wait for the judicial process to work. Professor Lawrence M. Friedman writes:
[T]he mob decided that honor demanded direct action-the honor of the white
woman, her family, and the community. The lynching was part of an "unwritten
code." Southerners distrusted the state, and preferred, in these cases, "personal
justice." They "believed strongly that community justice included both statutory law
and lynch law"; indeed, lynch law "was perceived as a legitimate extension of the
formal legal system."
FRIEDMAN, supra note 220, at 190 (citing ROBERT P. INGALLS, URBAN VIGILANTES IN THE NEW
SOUTH: TAMPA 1882-1936 4 (1988». For another excellent review of the complicated
question of the role lynching played in the system of punishment in America, see W.
FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH (1993).
230. JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 461
(1985). Blacks are overrepresented by a factor of four to one among persons arrested for
violent crimes (and represent about 1/2 of those arrested for murder and rape).ld.
Ironically, African-Americans are overwhelmingly more likely to be the victims of
homicide. The overall rate at which black men are killed is more than six times greater than
the rate at which white men are killed, and for black males age 25-29 the rate of homicide is
over seven-times higher. ld. at 463-65. In 1994, blacks represented 1,432 per 100,000
prisoners, while whites only registered a rate of 203 per 100,000. BUREAU OF JUSTICE 1994
STATISTICS cited in Bernard Gauzer, Life Behind Bars, PARADE, Aug. 13, 1995 at 4.
231 . See supra note 219.
232. MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 77 (1973). One white lawyer made the following observations regarding the
issue of race and punishment in the Upper South in a 1940 letter:
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twentieth century overwhelmingly support the existence of this racial bias in
punishment. For example, "Texas Courts indicted some 500 white men for
the murder of blacks in 1865 and 1866, but not one was convicted."233
About seventy-five years later, in Florida in 1940, forty-five out of fortyeight blacks were sentenced to death for the rape of white women, while no
white men were sentenced to death for the rape of black women. 234
Similarly, when Marvin Wolfgang studied the relationship between rape as a
capital offense and the race of the victim as it relates to capital punishment,
he found that "during the twenty year period from 1945 to 1965 in seven
southern states . . . there has been a systematic, differential practice of
imposing the death penalty on blacks for rape and, most particularly, when
the defendants are black and their victims are white.',235
Of course, all of these disparities were not created by sentencing juries
alone, but much of what the statistics may indicate is unarticulated,
unconscious racial bias. Justice Harry Blackmun recently addressed these
concerns in Callins v. Collins:

The arbitrariness inherent in the sentencer's discretion to afford mercy is
exacerbated by the problem of race. Even under the most sophisticated death
penalty statutes, race continues to playa major role in determining who shall
(June 19, 1940): "When the cases involve no such issues [on the race question] but
are merely cases, I have noted that cases between Negro and Negro are handled
somewhat differently than cases between white and white. I mean a spirit of levity,
an expectation of something 'comical' appears to exist. The seriousness in the white
vs. Negro case is decidedly lacking. As you know it is a rare case indeed in which a
Negro who has murdered a Negro receives the extreme penalty, either death or life
imprisonment here, regardless of the facts. Only the other day in a local case a Negro
who murdered another with robbery as a motive. a charge that would have been as
between white and white, or Negro and white victim, good for the electric chair, was
disposed of by a jury with a 15 year sentence. The punishment as between Negro and
Negro, as distinguished from white vs. white, or Negro vs. white victim, is decidedly
different and clearly shows the racial approach to the question. In short the courtroom feeling is that the Negro is entirely inferior, with punishment for crimes by him
against his own kind punished with less punishment than when the white man is
involved."
. ARNOLD ROSE, THE NEGRO IN AMERICA 180 n.8 (1944).
233. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, AMERICA'S UNFINISHEOREVOLUTION 204 (1990).
234. Meltsner, supra note 232, at 76-77.
235. MARVIN E. WOLFGANG. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE DEATH SENTENCE FOR
RAPE, in BOWERS, supra note 157, at 109-113 (1974). See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1976) (invalidating capital punishment for rape when no homicide is committed in part
because of disparities regarding the race of the victim).
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live and who shall die. Perhaps it should not be surprising that the biases and
prejudices that infect society generally would influence the detennination of
who is sentenced to death ....236
Blackmun went on to discuss the racial statistics offered in McCleskey.
He relied on Justice Brennan's dissent, which noted that unrefuted studies
showed that blacks who kill whites are sentenced to death "at nearly 22 times
the rate of blacks who kill blacks . . . ,"237 characterizing the evidence of
racial prejudice in McCleskey as "staggering."238
The problem identified in McCleskey has not abated. One Georgia study
indicated from 1973 to 1990 African Americans comprise 65 percent of
murder victims, while whites comprise 35 percent. The death penalty was
sought in 85 percent of the murder cases that involved white victims, but
only in 15 percent of those involving black victims. 239 The unexplained
racial disparity that has existed in capital punishment cannot be ignored. The
link between racial discrimination and the possibility that a jury will impose
death because its members identify with the victim rather than the defendant
is always a possibility. For example, if a jury has few or no African
Americans, and there is an African American defendant a death sentence
may be more likely. More jurors may identify with the victim because of
characteristics the jury perceives it shares with the victim. 240
It is, of course, difficult to generalize about how juries go about the
business of imposing death. One thing, however, is certain: the racial
statistics haunt the capital sentencing process in America. 241 The existence
236.

Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1153 (1992)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
[d. (quoting McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 327 (1987».
[d. See also HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF
THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 239-40 (1993) (citing a section of the
"Chattahoochee Report" entitled "Victims' Families: A Contrast in Black and White" at 3).
237.
238.

239.

[d.

240. The American Bar Association has supported legislation focusing on eliminating
the death penalty based on either the race of the victim or the race of the offender. In
congressional hearings held on February 22,1994, Professor Randolph N. Stone, Chairperson
of the ABA's Criminal Justice Section stated that the policy of the ABA was to support
"enactment of federal and state legislation which strives to eliminate any racial consideration
in capital sentencing." Hearings on H.R. 3315 and 3355 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and
Crim. Justice, House Jud. Comm., available in 1994 WL 14168864, at *3. See A.B.A. House
of Delegates Report No. 109 (Annual Meeting 1988) 35.T.
241. During a Capital Hill hearing concerning habeas corpus, Ronald S. Matthias,
Deputy Attorney General of California, suggested that the existence of unexplained racial
impact on capital sentencing does not suggest that one should "assume, in the absence of
proof, that the 'criminal justice system values victims differently' based on their race and that
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of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system through the centuries
has left a stain on the entire capital sentencing process. The specter of racial
prejudice intrudes on efforts to institute a systematic and neutral death
penalty.
Can we be sure that juries do not impose death based on their own
personal bias or prejudices?242 As long as victim impact plays a role in
capital sentencing, comparison of the victim to the defendant by jurors is
inevitable. Jurors will use their personal views and experiences to make such
comparisons. If the statistics indicating racial disparity reflect subconscious
racism in the sentencing process, there is no reason to expect that such
factors it will not continue. It will remain difficult to determine when and
how racial considerations have intruded on the capital sentencing process. 243
One group of commentators, led by the well-regarded expert on racial
discrimination in capital sentencing, Professor David Baldus,244 has
suggested that it may be possible to eliminate racial discrimination in capital
sentencing.245 They argue that "[wJith proper procedures and firm
enforcement of proscriptions against racial discrimination . . . capital
sentencing systems can be largely purged of the discrimination that currently
a murderer whose victim is white will for that reason be punished more severely than a victim
whose murderer is a person of color." Habeas Corpus: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Congo 531 (1994)
(statement of Ronald S. Mathias, Deputy Attorney General of California).
242. Recent public attention brought to the jury process by the sensational OJ.
Simpson murder case suggests that, like it or not, race influences our attitudes about the
justice system. One pollster noted that "[oln almost every issue, blacks and whites are nearly
mirror images of one another-on Simpson's innocence, police conduct, and the jury's
efforts." Betty Streisand et aI., The Verdict's Aftermath, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT Oct.
16, 1995, at 34. Simpson was acquitted by a majority black jury for the killing of his ex-wife
and a friend. Another poll taken after the case suggested that 36 percent of whites believed
that black jurors are more likely to convict a defendant who is white and 59 percent of black
jurors and 40 percent of white jurors believed white jurors are more likely to convict a
defendant if he is black. Joe Urschel, Poll: A Nation More Divided, USA TODAY, Oct. 9,
1995,at5A.
243. In the early years of our country's history, the system of criminal justice in
capital cases for blacks, both free and slave, was meager at best. In South Carolina, for
example, blacks had no right to a trial by jury and no right to appeal a capital offense prior to
1833. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MAITER OF COLOR, RACE AND THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 180 (1978). Such examples of inequality in process at
the foundation of our legal system, while not dispositive, cannot be ignored.
244. David C. Baldus et aI., Reflections on the "Inevitability" of Racial
Discrimination in Capital Sentencing and the "Impossibility" of Its Prevention, Detection,
and Correction, 51 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 359 (1994).
245. Id. at 359-63.
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exists."246 The absence of substantial legislative action in this area, It IS
suggested, "enable judges and legislators to avoid difficult choices."247 It is
further explained by the writers that by failing to take steps to eliminate
discrimination in capital sentencing, states avoid recognition of the
legitimacy of claims of racial discrimination in individual cases and thus
avoid the "additional cost, complexity and delay"248 of permitting such
claim to be established. "Thus, acceptance of claims of impossibility and
inevitability avoids the necessity to confront a variety of unpalatable issues.
Acceptance of these claims also avoids responsibility for the existing state of
affairs and justifies the status quo."249
Assuming that Professor Baldus and his colleagues are correct in their
assertion that discrimination in capital sentencing may be eliminated or
dramatically reduced, the question of what procedures might realistically be
implemented remains. Dramatic legislative reform of capital punishment
statutes to take into account specific racial discrimination challenges is
highly unlikely.250 Abolition of capital punishment is an even more remote
prospect. 251 Thus, we are left with the current system, unable to justify or
explain the "staggering" racial discrimination statistics and victim-based
preference that it seems to encourage. Indeed, even the most recent collection
of statistical evidence suggests that the problem has not changed. A general
accounting office report on the death penalty reviewed 28 empirical studies
of the death penalty and discovered in 82 percent of them, "race of [the]
246. [d. at 359. Some scholars have rejected the view that racism can be eliminated
from our society and thus, cannot be eliminated from jury decisions to impose capital
punishment. Professor Derrick Bell writes that "Black people will never gain full equality in
this country. Even- those Herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than
temporary 'peaks of progress.''' DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE
PERMANENCE OF RACISM 12 (1992).
247. Baldus, supra note 244, at 417 .
248. [d. at 362.
249. [d. at 363.
250. [d. at 418. The only federal legislative response to the problem of racial
discrimination in capital sentencing is a provision that requires that the judge instruct the jury
that in considering whether death is justified "it shall not consider the race, color, religious
beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim." 18 V.S.C.A. § 3593(f). If
the jury finds "death," each member must sign a certificate that race nor any of the other
prohibited matters entered into their decision. [d. A particular capital defendant may not
believe that this section offers sufficient protection against discrimination and may still elect a
judge sentencing. This provision appears to adopt the policy endorsed by the American Bar
Association. See supra note 240.
251. See supra note 139, citing the growing popUlarity of capital punishment.

422

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:367

victim was found to influence the likelihood of being charged with capital
murder or receiving the death penalty."252
VII. THE CASE FOR PRETRIAL DISCLOSURE: JURY OR NO JURY? THAT IS THE
QUESTION
The demand for victim participation in the sentencing process has been
overwhelming. The political process has recognized their cause and has
passed legislation to advance the goals of the victim's rights movement. 253
The Supreme Court responded by overruling Booth in order to remove a
substantial constitutional impediment to victim participation in capital·
sentencing. 254
What remains is the question of whether the legislatures or courts will
respond to the serious concerns left unaddressed by Payne regarding how our
justice system should manage victim impact information in capital jury
sentencing.
I propose that a rather complete disclosure of victim impact testimony be
made pre-trial. Such disclosure should include notification of how many
persons wish to provide information, the contents of their statement, and
whether their statement would be offered in oral or written form. 255 This
disclosure should be made very early in the capital sentencing process.
252. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES PATTERNS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 5 (1990).
253. See supra note 137.
254. See discussion notes 54-85.
255. I would propose the following statutory scheme to make the use of victim impact
evidence more predictable.
(A) If a prosecutor has filed a notice to seek the death penalty in accordance with
state law he shall, in compliance with this subsection, file a notice of intent to
introduce victim impact testimony at least 30 days prior to the time that
defendant is required to make his election of a fact finder in the case. Such
notice shall set out in reasonable detail a list of potential witnesses expected to
offer victim impact testimony and provide a written summary of the proposed
testimony of each potential witness.
(8) A notice of intent to present impact testimony shall with reasonable specificity:
(i) identify the name, address and relationship of the proposed witness to the
victim.
(ii) briefly summarize the testimony the witness intends to present regarding
the economic and emotional harm they have suffered as a result of the
crime.
(a) If the surviving victim is a minor, a parent or guardian may assist
the prosecutor with providing the disclosure under this subsection.
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Pre-trial disclosure is the only viable solution to the major problems that
the use of victim impact in capital sentencing creates. I offer this proposal on
the assumption that in cases where the victim impact infonnation is
extremely emotional and extensive, the most important decision the
defendant can make is whether he wants a lay jury to decide the question of
death at all. 256 Some infonnation intended to be offered by the victim could
be so volatile that a defendant would rather take his chances with a trained

(iii)

State which surviving victims intend to present oral testimony in open
court and which will submit a written statement to the jury, or both.
(a) If the prosecutor intends to read a victim impact statement on behalf
of the victims, such an intention should be made at the time of the
notice referred to in this subsection.
(b) If the prosecutor intends to offer victim impact testimony through a
representative family member or surviving victim, such an
intervention should be made at the time of the notice referred to in
this subsection.
(c) A victim impact statement shall not be presented to the jury unless
the prosecutor has complied with the notice provisions of this
subsection.
(C) Prior to the time for filing a disclosure, a prosecutor may make a motion for a
protective order or a postponement to provide disclosure for good cause
shown. Any such motion shall be conducted at a time sufficient to provide the
defendant 30 days prior to his election of the factfinder.
(D) After the prosecution's disclosure, the defendant shall file a notice of intention
to object to the proposed victim impact testimony and with reasonable
specificity state which portions of the proposed victim impact testimony that
the defendant intends to object, and offer concise reasons for that objection.
(E) If a motion to object to victim impact testimony is filed by the defendant, the
judge shall set a hearing prior to defendant's election of a sentencer and rule on
the defendant's objections. Any grounds for defendant's objections to victim
impact testimony that are not made prior to trial pursuant to this subsection
shall only be entertained by the trial court in its discretion and for good cause
shown. Defense counsel shall be required to renew his objections to the victim
impact testimony out of the presence of the jury at the time of the sentencing
hearing or such objections will be deemed to be waived.
256. As noted earlier, most states do provide for an option of jury or judge sentencing.
See supra note 5. However, the problem of electing a factfinder may become more
complicated in those states which require that once a defendant elects a judge for guilt or
innocence he may not request a jury for sentencing purpose only. See Stephen Gillers,
Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 102-19 (1980) (article noting that Colorado,
Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Utah and Wyoming provide that a waiver of a jury trial on guilt or innocence
constitutes a waiver of a jury sentencing).
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professional jurist. 257 It is doubtful that a defendant could make a knowing
and intelligent election of a factfinder without knowledge of the most
potentially damaging information to be offered against him.258
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the right to some Due
Process protection in criminal sentencing in the area of discovery,259 it has
never gone so far as to create a right to discovery prior to jury selection in
order to assist a defendant in the sentencing phase of a capital case. The
Supreme Court has recognized, however, that the unique character of death
as punishment makes it different and thus different rules may be required in
order to advance the goal of fair sentencing.260 The need for early pretrial
disclosure emanates from the confusion caused by the fact that victim impact
information does not have a clear position in most capital punishment
schemes.
Most states that have capital punishment utilize a process of weighing
and balancing aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances in

257. It has long been suggested that a "judges' repeated experience with criminal
cases will often fit him better to deal fairly and scientifically with convicted defendants than
an ordinary jury." LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO ApPEAL 537
(1947). See also State v. Gulbrandson, 906 P.2d 579 (Ariz. 1995) Uudges are capable of not
focusing on irrelevant testimony in a victim impact statement); State v. Williams, 904 P.2d
437 (Ariz. 1995) (absent evidence to the contrary a trial judge in a capital case is capable of
focusing on relevant sentencing factors and setting aside the irrelevant, inflammatory and
emotional factors); State v. Bolton, 896 P.2d 830 (Ariz. 1995) (victim's testimony not
relevant to sentencing factors was improper but trial court was presumed not to have
considered it); State v. Fautenberry, 650 N.E.2d 878,882 (Ohio 1995) (three-judge panel was
presumed not to consider remarks regarding victims' recommendation of sentence).
258. The Supreme Court has recognized that important decisions, such as waiving
rights or exercising choices, should be made with "the express and intelligent consent of the
defendant." Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930). It would be impossible to
make a reasonably intelligent choice while exercising the right without sufficient information
about what the prosecution intends to present.
259. See supra notes 182-89. The Supreme Court has recognized that due process does
require time allowed to receive information and prepare for an issue in a capital sentencing
he?ring, however, the Court has never issued a discovery ruling requiring that a defendant be
given information which is designed to help him select a jury or elect his factfinder prior to a
death penalty case.
260. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) (Supreme Court
recognized that "the qualitative difference of death from all other punishment requires a
correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny by capital sentencing determinations"). It is,
however, ironic that in the area of civil litigation reform, the bench and bar have recently
moved to a position that endorses open discovery. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a) (provides for
mandatory prediscovery disclosure in civil cases).
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order to determine if death is an appropriate sentence.261 In most statutes,
victim impact is not an aggravating circumstance and accordingly does not
require that pretrial disclosure be provided to the defendant. 262 The recently
enacted federal death penalty law's victim impact provisions make early
notice to the defendant by the prosecutor only optiona1. 263 The fact that the
jurors do not know how victim impact fits into the sentencing scheme may
lead to arbitrary results. 264
261. For an excellent article describing the variety of weighing and balancing statutes
across the country, see James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Matters of Life or Death: The
Sentencing Provisions in Capital Punishment Statutes, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 19-60 (1995).
262. Several courts have recently addressed the question of whether victim impact is
an aggravating circumstance or even has an aggravating effect on a death sentence. Many of
the courts examining the issue have reached the conclusion that it does not. See State v.
Williams, 904 P.2d 437, 453 (Ariz. 1995) (court found that victim impact is not an
aggravating circumstance); see also State v. Greenway, 823 P.2d 22, 30 (Ariz. 1991) (court
held victim impact not to be an aggravating circumstance); Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432,
438 (Fla. 1995) (court found that victim impact is not a nonstatutory aggravating
circumstance). It may be that many statutes do not list '" victim impact' as an aggravating
factor" but it cannot be questioned that it is offered to assist the jury in determining that death
is an appropriate sentence.
263. The recently enacted federal death penalty law makes provisions for
consideration of victim impact in determining whether seeking the death penalty is
appropriate. This law provides that as part of mandatory notice to the defendant, the
government may include factors concerning the effect of the crime on the victim and the
victim's family. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(a)(2) (West 1996). However, the statute does not list
victim impact as an aggravating factor, but merely as a "factor." This may present
constitutional problems when a jury attempts to "factor" the victim's value into its
deliberation. See infra note 264. Furthermore, even if the government exercises its option to
provide notice of victim impact before trial, the statute does not make it clear how much
detail is required or whether there is a sanction for failing to provide such notice.
264. In Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 368 (1988), the Supreme Court recognized
that potential jury confusion might be a basis upon which to invalidate a capital sentence.
The Supreme Court has stated that "in a State where the sentencer weighs aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, the weighing of an invalid aggravating circumstance violates
the Eighth Amendment." Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1081 (1992). See also Sochor v.
Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 231 (1992); Parker v.
Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 315 (1991); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738,752 (1990). The
Supreme Court explained:
[t]here is Eighth Amendment error when the sentencer weighs an "invalid"
aggravating circumstance in reaching the ultimate decision to impose a death
sentence. Employing an invalid aggravating factor in the weighing process "creates
the possibility ... of randomness," by placing a "thumb [on] death's side of the
scale," thus "creating the risk [of] treating the defendant as more deserving of the
death penalty," Even when other valid aggravating factors exist as well, merely
affirming a sentence reached by weighing an invalid aggravating factor deprives a
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If victim impact is not an aggravating circumstance, what do you balance
it against? Certainly it is not a mitigating circumstance so it must have some
characteristics of an aggravating circumstance since it is offered by the
prosecution to support its demand for a death sentence. The current system
that makes it unclear how victim impact is to be considered could
theoretically permit a sentencing jury to determine that victim impact might
be sufficient to outweigh all mitigating factors when combined with any
other aggravating factor proven under a given statute. Since the law does not
make clear how victim impact is to be weighed or by what standard of proof
it should be measured, it becomes an arbitrary "wild card" in the capital
punishment scheme. Its aggravating effect may never be revealed because its
absence as an aggravating factor on the jury verdict sheet provides no clue as
to how it assisted the jurors in outweighing the mitigating circumstances.
In a case where highly emotional victim impact testimony may be
offered, jurors may believe that they could find it aggravating and thereafter
give whatever weight deemed necessary until the balance equaled "death."
The fact that it is unclear how it should be considered may lead a defendant
to avoid the risks of juror confusion altogether by avoiding a jury sentencing.
The serious problems a defense attorney may encounter when attempting to
cross-examine a victim or otherwise challenge the veracity of their character
or suffering265 may further reinforce the conclusion that a judge sentencing
would more desirable. 266
Pre-trial disclosure advances the goal of an orderly death penalty by
integrating the victim impact information into a predictable pre-trial
procedure in much the same way such hearings are used in most jurisdictions
with suppression motions or motions in limine held pre-trial. 267 Questions of
defendant of "the individualized treatment that would result from actual reweighing
of the mix of mitigating factors and aggravating circumstances."
Sochor, 504 U.S. at 527,532 (citations omitted).
265. See discussion supra Section V, on confrontation.
266. In one Maryland capital case that involved a felony murder and highly emotional
victim impact testimony, three separate juries rendered a death sentence. Harris v. State, 539
A.2d 637 (1988). After the fourth remand, the defendant requested a court sentencing and
received a life sentence. [d. It may have been that the victim impact testimony was too
damaging for any jury to consider a life sentence.
267. The motion in limine, which is a device used to deal with potentially prejudicial
matters at pretrial and out of the presence of the jury, has become an accepted mechanism to
assure the accused's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. See Douglas L.
Colbert, The Motion in Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases: Silencing the Defendant at
Trial, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1274-81 (J 987) (presenting a cogent discussion of the history
and development of the motion in limine).
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relevance and the scope of the victim impact information can be examined
by the judge exercising appropriate discretion as to what will be introduced
at a sentencing hearing long before the jury is empaneled. 268
In those extremely rare instances when a defendant may want to
challenge the validity of the victim impact information, pre-trial disclosure
will provide adequate time to investigate and prepare challenges to the
victims' testimony. Any attorney preparing a case obviously cannot confront
testimony without adequate investigation.269
Pre-trial disclosure facilitates the defendant's preparation of mitigation
so that he may respond to the adverse effects of victim impact testimony,270
since victim impact testimony is likely to have an aggravating effect on the
jury .271 Pre-trial disclosure helps eliminate the prosecutor's strategic
advantage in controlling the use and timing of victim impact testimony at
trial. 272
The early disclosure of victim impact testimony facilitates the process of
capital jury selection by providing the defendant with information about
what the jury will hear if they find the defendant eligible for death.273
The assistance of the victim impact information in jury selection is
particularly important, considering the limitations recently placed on the
defendant in exercising peremptory challenges in fashioning the jury that
268. Procedure should pennit election after the defendant finds out what victim impact
is being presented as evidence.
269. Failure to engage in proper pre-trial investigation by defense counsel has been
held to be a violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel and of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process provisions. See Kimmelmon v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 366 (1986); Sullivan v. Fainnan, 819 F.2d 1382, 1391-93 (7th Cir.
1987) (failure to contact witnesses who would have contradicted government witness).
Complete failure to investigate does not necessarily lead to reversal. See Burger v. Kemp, 483
U.S. 776, 777 (1987); Hoots v. Allsbrook, 785 F.2d 1214, 1221 (4th Cir. 1986) (failure to
investigate was not prejudicial error); Ballou v. Booker, 777 F.2d 910, 914 (4th Cir. 1985)
(defense counsel's failure to interview rape victim or physician did not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel); Aldrich v. Wainwright, 777 F.2d 630, 633 (I Ith Cir. 1985) (counsel's
admission that he was unprepared and his failure to investigate state's witnesses were
unreasonable perfonnances but not prejudicial).
270. Coyne, supra note 207.
271. This seems obvious since the tragedy of the victim's loss told to a sentencing jury
is certainly not mitigating evidence.
272. Most statutes that govern the use of victim impact are silent as to at what stage of
the proceeding it may be offered.
273. Since in most capital cases the same jury will consider guilt and punishment, a
defendant may have to select a jury as much for its consideration of possible punishment as
for any other factor.
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will decide his fate. No longer can a defendant challenge on the basis of the
prospective jurors' race or gender in an effort to shape the outcome of his
trial. 274 This alone may be sufficient reason to make a jury trial less
desirable. Thus, pretrial disclosure will permit the defendant to either elect
no jury or select a jury he believes to be fair.275 Add to the equation the
long-held concerns that capital juries are already "conviction prone" by the
manner in which they are selected,276 and a jury sentencing without full use
of peremptory challenges may become less desirable.
Policy reasons for pre-trial disclosure should not favor only the
defendant. There are several advantages of pre-trial disclosure that benefit
the victims as well. First, pre-trial disclosure facilitates the effective
assistance of counsel 277 preparing a capital case. Enhancing preparation of
defense counsel reduces the prospect of appellate reversal of a death sentence
and reduces many potential areas of collateral attack. 278 This will result in
274. The doctrine first announced in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
permitting a defense counsel to object to a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in a
discriminatory manner was recently extended to defense counsel permitting prosecutors to
object to their challenges as well. See also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992). Two
terms later, the Supreme Court extended its prohibition to peremptory challenges based on the
juror's gender. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). These new prohibitions
dramatically change the strategic tools that an attorney may use to shape a capital defendant's
jury and obtain a jury he believes to be more favorably disposed to the defendant's case.
275. Jury selection in capital cases requires consideration of many intangible factors
like sociological data, psychological expertise, skillful questioning and intuition. CALIFORNIA
ArrORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE & CALIFORNIA PuBLIC DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION,
CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL vol. II, p. 11-25. A defendant, after being
advised of the potential inaccuracy of jury selection might choose a judge.
276. Although the Supreme Court has held that a capital jury which has been selected
after all persons who have "scruples" against imposing death have been excluded is not
unconstitutionally "conviction prone," see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), some
studies have indicated that such juries are more likely to convict. WaIter E. Oberer, Does
Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples against Capital Punishment Constitute Denial of a
Fair Trial an Issue afGuilt?, 39 TEX. L. REV. 545 (1961). A competent defense attorney may
take such a factor into account when determining with his client the type of sentence that is
most desirable.
277. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
278. The American Bar Association has stated concerns that effective counsel should
be provided very early in the capital sentencing process. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
TOWARD A MORE JUST AND EFFECfIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES
(1990); see also Guideline 11.2, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE
ApPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (1989) ("Counsel in
death penalty cases should be required to perform in the specialized practice of capital
representation zealously committed to the capital case who has adequate time and recourses
for preparation."). Some courts have rejected the notion that capital cases require a more
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fewer reversals on appeal and a shorter time period between the imposition
of a death sentence and the actual execution. 279 The Court in Payne
specifically reserved the possibility that some victim impact could violate
due process. 280 Pre-trial disclosure will give judges the opportunity to make
crucial decisions in a more controlled atmosphere. 281
Pre-trial disclosure will permit the judge to accommodate the special
needs of victims who are going to testify in open court. This would include
consideration of their special sensitivities and physical needs. Such hearings
may lead to some victims, with the agreement of counsel, videotaping their
presentations to avoid interruptions because of emotional breakdowns.282
Finally, early disclosure supports victim participation in a way that is
consistent with the goal of facilitating the emotional healing process. 283
Pre-trial disclosure will provide a way for the judge to prevent
manipulation and abuse of victims by the prosecution 284 and harassment by
the defense. 285 No party in the system should be permitted to exploit a
stringent test for competency of counsel. See State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 352, 561 A.2d
1082, 1089 (1989).
The reversal rate of capital cases on appeal has been reported as high as 46.3 percent. See
David A. Kaplan, Death Mill, USA, NAT'L L.J., May 8,1989, at 38.
.
279. Public disillusionment over delay and the high number of reversals have
generated negative attitudes from the public concerning the criminal justice system.
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 220, at 161. See infra note 289.
280. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). See Levy, supra note 163.
281. It seems sensible that a judge may more easily control the atmosphere of a
courtroom if he has some idea how witnesses who intend to offer emotionally charged
testimony may react.
282. A judge taking oral victim impact testimony out of the presence of the jury pretrial would be able to prepare to accommodate a victim that was physically impaired or
demonstrated particularly strong emotional sensitivity while testifying. The judge may even
feel compelled to preclude live oral testimony if the victim was unable to maintain their
composure or became prejudicially emotional.
283. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
284. Some troubling ethical issues may well arise as a result of the prosecutor's effort
to secure a conviction and death sentence with the aid of victim impact testimony. "For
example, how actively should a prosecutor seek the aid of grieving friends and family
members in attempting to secure a death sentence?" RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 302 (1994). Pretrial disclosure may limit
intentional family manipulation by requiring the prosecution to put its cards "face up" on the
table. Pre-trial disclosure also permits questioning of victim in the protective atmosphere of
the courtroom in a controlled pre-trial setting.
285. Victims of capital homicide have complained that defense counsel often
subpoena family members of the deceased as potential witnesses "with no intention of calling
them to testify, simply to keep them out of the site of the jury." Brooks Douglass, Oklahoma's
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victim for strategic advantage. Controlled management of victim impact
information is consistent with the goals of fair and non-arbitrary capital
sentencing. 286
If our system intends to do more than simply pay "lip service" to orderly
capital sentencing the advantages of pre-trial disclosure is a modest and
realistic proposal.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that victim participation in capital sentencing is here to
stay. All indications point to the overwhelming public support for capital
punishment. The fact that capital punishment is politically popular, however,
should not prevent reforms that make the system less arbitrary. Victim
impact testimony is, in many cases, the most important factor in whether a
capital defendant will receive the ultimate punishment.
Moral,287 philosophical,288 economic,289 and religious 290 arguments
have been raised against capital punishment over the last several decades.
Victim Impact Legislation: A New Voice for Victims and Their Families, 46 OKLA. L. REV.
283,287 (1993).
286. The Supreme Court has made it clear that "the channeling and limiting of the
sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamental constitutional
requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988).
287. One moral perspective on capital punishment is that the state may only take a life
in order to
protect its citizenry from the imminent danger of criminal action and in actual
resistance to felonious attempts "including attempts forcibly to avoid arrest or escape
custody." Once, however, the prisoner has been apprehended ... the right of the
State to take his life as punishment, retribution, revenge or retaliation ... does not
exist in moral law .
Donald EJ. MacNamara, The Case Against Capital Punishment, Social Action, April 1996,
at 4-15, reprinted in Statement Against Capital Punishment, THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY 184 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1964).
288. Some writers have suggested that capital punishment is an unacceptable
contradiction to the intrinsic worth of a human being. See L.S. Tao, Beyond Furman v.
Georgia: The Need for A Morally Based Decision on Capital Punishment, 51 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 722 (1976).
289. Some studies of the cost of a capital case through appeal have calculated costs as
high as $1.8 million. NEW YORK DEFENDER'S ASSOCIATION, INC., CAPITAL LOSSES: THE PRICE
OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR NEW YORK STATE 26 (1982). More conservative estimates have
been projected. A recent Maryland study estimated that a fully litigated capital case required
expenditures of about $400,000. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 220, at 193.
That study characterized the estimates for capital cases over $1.5 million as "excessive." Id.
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Despite its critics in this country and its abolition in the overwhelming
majority of western societies,291 the United States has been steadfast in its
support for capital punishment;292 recently, the popularity of the death
penalty has even caused a resurrection of capital punishment in places where
it had been dormant. 293 The most recent example of this resurgence is the
revival of the death penalty in the State of New York. 294
.
Few issues are more politically charged than that of support for the death
penalty. This is due to the perceived failure of the criminal justice system to
give victims voice, support, and even vengeance as part of their role in the
sentencing process. This perception has encouraged many political efforts by
victims to pursue greater direct influence on the system. While victims gain
greater rights295 and the courts relax impediments to their participation,
elected officials emphasize the changing climate as part of their routine
political discourse. 296 Not long ago, the newly-elected governor of New
York State, George E. Pataki, who ran an election campaign promising to
revive capital punishment, kept his promise by signing a death penalty bill
into law as one of his fIrst political acts. He emphasized his support for

290. From the 1950's through the 1980's, several religious organizations issued
official resolutions against capital punishment. Among those churches were: the American
Baptist Church, the American Jewish Committee, American Lutheran Church, the Episcopal
Church, American Friends Services Committee, the Mennonite Church, the Presbyterian
Church, United Church of Christ, United Methodist Church, and the United States Catholic
Conference. CAPITAL PuNISHMENT: WHAT THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY SAYS, NATIONAL
INTERRELIGIOUS TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1980).
291. It has recently been noted that, "[o]f all the countries we resemble in our values
and political system, none has capital punishment. All of Western Europe, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, most of Latin America and even some former Communist nations of Eastern
Europe have abolished it." JACK GREENBERG, CRusADERS IN THE COURTS 456 (1994).
292. The United States joins China, Iran, Iraq and Syria as the largest executors in the
world.ld. See also supra note 139 (statistic supporting the popularity of capital punishment).
293. Canada has recently discussed reviving capital punishment citing polls that
reflect as much as 69 percent popular support the return of a death penalty. See Doug Fischer,
Poll Finds Overwhelming Support for Return of Death Penalty, MONTREAL GAZETTE, July 10,
1995, at A5; David Crary, Canadians Clamor for Death Penalty, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July
11,1995,at8A.
294. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 400.27 (setting out procedures for determining sentence of
death for first degree murder, effective Sept. I, 1995).
295. See supra notes 119 and 112.
296. Former President George Bush discussed the Payne case as part of his
presentation remarks at the National Crime Victims' Rights Awards on April 24, 1992. See
Levy, supra note 163, at 1029 n.19.
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victims by signing the bill using the pens of two slain police officers.297 His
predecessor, Mario Cuomo, a twelve-year incumbent who consistently
vetoed death penalty legislation, commented that the new law resulted from
"fear, anger, short sightedness and some cynicism coming together to
overwhelm intelligence . . . . It's more than just sad, it's frightening."298
These statements demonstrate that capital punishment is still an explosive
and divisive issue in America.
Whether the reasons the death penalty maintains general strong support
from public fear, anger or cynicism as former Governor Cuomo suggests, the
penalty appears to be permanent. With the Supreme Court's decision in
Payne signaling the willingness of the Court to permit the political process to
grant greater victim participation, it is highly unlikely that state or federal
legislators will be eager to suggest victim participation be limited. 299
It is clear that as a society we have not examined the real consequences
of the Payne decision and our very conscious legislative choice to open the
death penalty process up to emotional and grief-ridden victims who have an
understandable desire to participate, but who also have an unpredictable
influence over the sentencing juries. 300 Will their testimony lead to the
valuing of some lives and some victims over others? Will racial disparities
related to white victims of African-American defendants ever be removed
from the process?301 Will we ever be able to explain to a sentencing jury
how they should consider the victim impact information in relationship to the
circumstances of the defendant or his crime? These and other questions may
never be answered. In the interim, however, people are being sentenced to
death in an atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty.
If this country must continue its long-standing pursuit of the perfect
death penalty, it should at least meet minimal standards of fundamental
faimess. 302 It makes no sense to go through the trouble of creating elaborate
297. Associated Press, Pataki signs N.Y. death penalty into law with pens of slain
officers, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 8,1995, at 16A.
298. Id.
299. Recent legislative activity that has led to several statutes and constitutional
amendments to advance victim's rights suggests that political support is still formidable.
300. See K. Elizabeth Whitehead, Note, Mourning Becomes Electric: Payne v.
Tennessee's Allowance of Victim Impact Statements During Capital Sentencing Proceedings,
45 ARK. L. REV. 531,552 (1992) (permitting victim impact statements reave courtrooms open
to "theatrics" before the sentencing juries).
301. See supra notes 244-52.
302. "It is of vital importance ... that any decision to impose the death sentence be,
and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion." Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349,358 (1977).
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capital punishment statutory schemes to protect the integrity of the process
and then fail to provide adequate procedural safeguards for the most
important and potentially volatile evidence that is likely to be presented in
support of a convicted murderer's possible execution. 303
In the recent aftermath of the OJ. Simpson trial, it has also been
demonstrated that the perceptions of the justice system among whites and
blacks differs. 304 Although this fact has been examined and discussed prior
to the recent popular opinion polls that have accompanied the OJ. Simpson
case,305 defense lawyers and capital defendants may now, more than ever,
have to consider the possible risks of opting for a jury sentencing since racial
and gender-based exclusion in jury selection has been legally prohibited. 306
With victim participation increasing, a capital defendant's well-informed
election between a judge or a jury may be the only realistic protection that
can be added to the capital punishment scheme in a country more willing
than ever to exercise the public's desire for more executions. 307 At a
minimum, the addition of extensive pre-trial disclosure of victim impact
information is consistent with a death penalty process that at least
superficially attempts to respect both defendants and victims in the most
serious decision that any criminal justice system can endorse.
The specter of racism and the potential inflammatory emotional content
of victim impact information requires that we treat victims and their
testimony with great care. Victims demand participation, but the integrity of
our judicial process requires that we do not totally lose control of the capital
punishment process to the forces of emotion, retribution, or political whim.
We must protect the valued option of jury sentencing for those capital
defendants who may choose juries. We must also facilitate the legitimate
concerns of a defendant to receive a fair sentencing trial and not permit the
303. See Whitehead, supra note 300, at 548-49.
304. See George Anastaplo, On Crime, Criminal Lawyers, and OJ. Simpson: Plato's
Gorgias Revisited, 26 Loy. CHI. LJ. 455, 466 n.26 ( 1995) (citing the differences in racial

attitudes between blacks and whites regarding Simpson's guilt reveal "the deep seated
reservations that African-Americans have about the criminal justice system in the United
States").
.
305. In his classic work on the racial problem in America during 'the late 19th and
early 20th century, Gunnar Myrdal noted that a legislative case can be made to establish that
both crime statistics and results in criminal courts are affected by discrimination in the
application of the criminal law. Thus, it is not surprising that attitudes toward the justice
system are effected by pervasive discrimination. See GUNNAR MYRDAL ET AL., AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 966-76 (1962).
306. See supra notes 274 and 275.
307. See supra note 139.
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victim to become the entire focus of a capital case. The goal should remain
that a sentence of death should be based primarily on "the character of the
individual and the circumstances of the crime."308
Society may demand that the punishment fit the victim and the law may
be moving toward accomplishing that result, but such a trend should not
permit a trial by "victim impact surprise." At a minimum, a capital defendant
should be given the raw materials necessary to make an informed decision
about who will judge whether he should die at a time when the information
will have some value to him. To do any less is inconsistent with the goal of
maintaining a fair capital sentencing process.

308.

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983).

